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Abstract 
This paper examines the ability of the yield curve to predict recessions in South Africa, 
and compares its predictive power with other commonly used variables that include the 
growth rate in real money supply, changes in stock prices and the index of leading 
economic indicators. The study also makes an attempt to find out if monetary policy 
explains the yield spread's predictive power with regards to future economic activity. 
Regarding methodology, the standard probit model proposed by Estrella and Mishkin 
(1996) that directly estimates the probability of the economy going into recession is used. 
Results from this model are compared with a modified probit model suggested by Dueker 
(1997) that includes a lagged dependent variable. 
Results presented in the paper provide further evidence that the yield curve, as 
represented by the yield spread between 3-month and IO-year government paper, can be 
used to estimate the likelihood of recessions in South Africa. The yield spread can 
produce recession forecasts up to 18 months, although it's best predictive power is seen 
at two quarters. Results from the standard probit model and the modified pro bit model 
with a lagged dependent variable are somewhat similar, although the latter model 
improves forecasts at shorter horizons up to 3 months. 
Compared with other indicators, real M3 growth is a noisy indicator and does not provide 
much information about future recessions, whilst movements in the All-Share index can 
provide information for up to 12 months but does not do better than the yield curve. The 
index of leading economic indicators outperforms the yield spread in the short run up to 4 
months but the spread performs better at longer horizons. Based on the results from the 
study, it appears that changes in monetary policy explain the yield spread's predictive 
power. This is because the yield spread loses its explanatory power when combined with 
a variable representing the monetary policy stance of the central bank. 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background .... .. ..... ..... . .. ...... .. ..... ...... ....... .. ........... .. . .... .. .... . ....... .. ........ 8 
1.2 Problem Statement.. .... . .. ........ ....... ....... . ... .... ..... .. .. .. .............. ...... .. . ... II 
1.3 Goals of the Resear ch ... ... ......... .. ... .... .. " . . ....... . .... ... .. . .... ....... .. ... . ..... .. 12 
1.4 Justification for the study ..................................... . .............. . . . ..... ........ 13 
1.5 Methodology ..... . . ..... . .. . .. .. ......... .. . . ... . . . ... ..... . ... . . ..... . . ....... ...... .. ... . ..... 15 
1.5.1 Data types and sources ....................... ... ......... ....... . .. ................. 15 
1.5 .2 Method of analysis .. ........ .. ... . ......... . ....... .... ...... .. ............ .. ....... 15 
1.6 Scope ofthe study .... ......... ...... ... .. ......... ... ......... .... .. . ....... ... ............... 15 
1.7 Outline ofthe study .... ...................... .... ........ .. .... .. ..... . ............. ......... .. 16 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theoretical Issues . . ..... ........ .. .... .... ...... . ........... .. ..... .... ... ... . ....... .... ...... 17 
2.1.1 Introduction . ......... . ..... ... ........................................................ 17 
2.1.2 Business Cycle theory ............................................... ........... . .... 17 
2.1.3 Yield Curve theory .... ....... ..... ... .... ....... . .......................... . . ... .. ... 22 
2.1.4 Explaining the shape of the yield curve and economic activity ............. .. 29 
2.2 Empirical literature ...... ........ ............ ......... .. ...................................... 33 
2.2.1 Introduction .... ...... .. . ..... .... ......... .. ... . ... .... .. . .. ..... ...... .. ............. 33 
2.2.2 Forecasting real economic growth ..... .. ..... .. ........ ...... .. . .. .............. . 34 
2.2.3 Forecasting recessions . . .. ... . . ... ........ .................... . ..................... 38 
2.3 Summary ........... ......... .. .. .. . .... ... .. . .... ...... .. ........ .. .. ... ............... . ....... .46 
3 
CHAPTER 3 
SOUTH AFRICA'S BUSINESS CYCLE SINCE THE EARLY 1980s 
3.1 Introduction ..................... . .. . .. .. . ..... . ..... ........ ..... ....... ....... .. .............. .48 
3.2 Business Cycle phases . ............................... ... .. .... .. .. .. ............... . ......... .48 
3.2.1 The business cycle in the 1980s .................................................... 49 
3.2.2 The business cycle in the 1990s ..................... ... .......................... .. 52 
3.3 The yield spread and the business cycle in South Africa ........... ......... .......... 56 
3.4 The business cycle and other economic indicators ....... .... .......................... 59 
3.4.1 The business cycle and stock prices .... ...... .......... ... ... .. . .... ... ... ..... .. 59 
3.4.2 The business cycle and changes in money supply ............................... 61 
3.4.3 The business and the index of leading economic indicators ................. . 62 
CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction . .... .... . .... ... . . . ....... .... ... . .. .. . . ........................................... 64 
4.2 Business Cycle and forecasting methods .. ...................... .... ... . ................. 64 
4.3 Model and estimation methods ....... ...... ................................................ 68 
4.3.1 The probit model. .. .................................................................. 68 
4.3.2 Indicators examined and data used ................................................ 71 
4.4 Summary .............. ........... ................................. . ....................... . .. ... 73 
4 
CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Introduction ................. . ............ . . ................. ...... .......... ......... ........... 74 
5.2 Yield Spread: In-sample results ............................................... .. .. ......... 74 
5.3 Comparison with other variables ..... ........ . ..... : .... ..... ........ ............ .......... 78 
5.3.1 Real M3 growth ...................................................... ... ............ 78 
5.3.2 Changes in the JSE All-Share Index ................ ...... .. .. ........ .... ....... . 78 
5.3.3 Index of Leading Economic Indicators .......................... .... .. ........... 80 
5.3.4 Variables Combined ................... ..... ......................................... 82 
5.4 Modified pro bit model. ....................................................................... 83 
5.5. Is monetary policy responsible for the yield spread's power? ...................... 86 
5.6 Summary .. ........................................ .......... ........ ... .. . ..... ..... ........... . 89 
CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 Summary offindings . ... ............................................ .. ......... .... ......... 90 
6.2 Why did the yield curve give a false signal in 2003? ....................... .... ....... 91 
6.3 Policy implications and recommendations ................................ .. ............ 93 
5 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Business Cycle phases of South Africa since 1981.. ..... .. ..................... .48 
Table 2: Yield spread: Results from simple probit model. .... ............................ 74 
Table 3: Probability of a recession as predicted by the best probit model.. ... ........ 76 
Table 4: Results from probit model based on real M3 growth ..... ......... . ...... . ..... 78 
Table 5: Results from pro bit model based on the AJI-share Index ...................... 79 
Table 6: Results from probit model based on the Index of Leading Economic 
Indicators .. ......................... . ............ . ................... . .. . ............................ 80 
Table 7: Measures of fit for probit model variables by themselves ................. .... 81 
Table 8: Measures of fit for multi-variate probit models in-sample (pseudo R2) ... .. 82 
Table 9: Results from modified probit model.. ... ....... . ... .. .................... ... ....... 84 
Table 10: results from combination of repo rate and yield spread ... . .. .. .. . ....... . ... 87 
LIST OF GRAPHS 
Figure 1: Yield spread and business cycle in South Africa .... .. ...... .. ....... . .... ..... .56 
Figure 2: JSE All-share Index and the business cycle ...................................... 60 
Figure 3: Real M3 growth and the business cycle ........................................... 61 
Figure 4: Recession probabilities based on yield spread (5m horizon) .. . .. ............. 76 
Figure 5: Recession probabilities based on changes in All-share Index ................ 79 
Figure 6: Recession probabilities based on changes in the index of leading economic 
indicators (4m horizon) .... . .............. . ............. . ............... . . . .. . .. . ...... . .......... 80 
Figure 7: Simple versus Modified probitforecasts (6m) .. ........... .............. ....... 85 
Figure 8: Simple versus Modified probit forecasts (3m) .. ....... .. ......... . ..... ..... .. . 86 
Figure 9: Yield spread versus Repo rate: Probit forecasts (6m) . .................. ... .. 88 
REFERENCES ............................................. . ...... . ... . . .. ......................... 95 
APPENDICES . . . .............. . . .. ............. ......... .. ....... . . . .. .. .. ........ .. ..... . . ...... I 00 
6 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
My first acknowledgement goes to my principal supervisor, Mr. Meshach Aziakpono 
from the Economics Department at Rhodes University for his help throughout the 
dissertation. I am also highly indebted to Professor Pierre Faure for his help in the early 
stages of the paper. I would also like to thank the Central Bank of Swaziland, together 
with the Ministry of Public Service and Employment, for giving me the opportunity to 
further my studies at Rhodes University. A special thanks goes to my family, friends, 
colleagues and staff in the Economics Department for helping me in different ways 
towards the fulfillment of this study. 
7 
CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Economies have been historically observed to experience cycles in economic activity. 
Rather than grow steadily year after year, economies go through recurring intervals of 
economic expansion followed by times of contraction. These intervals are termed 
business or trade cycles and are characterised by recurrent but non-periodic fluctuations 
in the general business activity of the economy. Each cycle consists of four phases: a 
lower turning point (trough), an expansion, an upper turning point (peak) and a 
contraction. South Africa (RSA) has been no exception to this. 
South Africa's economy continues to power ahead and data for the second quarter (2004) 
shows that real gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 4% from 311, % in the previous 
quarter. The present economic upswing, which commenced during the third quarter of 
1999, represents the longest period of uninterrupted quarter-on-quarter growth since 1960 
(SARB, 2004:3). Since economies are observed to move in cycles, the question is how 
long this expansion will last before we see the next recession. Policymakers always seek 
to avoid recessions and steer the economy on a steady non-inflationary growth path and 
are always on the lookout for information that provides the likelihood of recessions. 
Business cycle theory identifies two sets of factors that drive the cyclical movements of 
the economy: exogenous disturbances and the endogenous components of the economic 
system (Zarnowitz, 1972: 17). Attributing business cycles to exogenous disturbances 
means that cumulative effects of external shocks or unexpected events cause economic 
fluctuations and these may include wars, inventions, oil price shocks, variations in 
weather or political and economic policy changes (Zarnowitz, 1972: 17). 
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Endogenous l causes of instability in the economic system may be attributed to the 
decisions of governments, financial market participants or businesses. If business cycles 
are caused by exogenous factors (external shocks to the economic system), it means we 
can never predict recessions, whilst on the other hand, if they are caused by observable 
decisions of economic agents, policymakers have a better chance of understanding, 
predicting and avoiding recessions. 
Central bankers, investors and financial market participants normally use complex 
macroeconomic models and composite indexes of leading business cycle indicators to 
forecast the path of the economy and the likelihood of recessions. Financial variables 
such as interest rates, stock prices and monetary aggregates also provide useful 
information about future economic activity (Estrella and Mishkin, 1996:1). Such financial 
indicators may be used to double-check both econometric and judgmental predictions as 
they are fairly quick and simple to use (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:46). Proponents of 
financial indicators as forecasting tools maintain that financial markets are good 
aggregators of information because of broad participation in the markets and suggest that 
market participants have strong incentives to price securities as closely as possible to 
their fundamental values (Dueker, 1997:41). 
The yield curve (the spread between the yields on long and short term government bonds) 
has been observed by researchers to be a useful forecasting tool. The yield curve2 can be 
seen as a crystal ball that incorporates a wide range of information regarding the future 
development of inflation, the level of economic activity and interest rates. There is a 
significant body of empirical evidence to suggest that the yield spread is a useful tool for 
forecasting inflation, recessions, interest rates and possibly even the growth rate of real 
output (see Stojanovic and Vaughan, 1997:10, Nel, 1996:161 and Estrella and Mishkin, 
1996:1). 
I Endogenous in the sense that the business cycle is detennined by factors within the economic system. 
2 The yield spread is assumed to mean the yield curve in this paper. 
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According to Dueker (1997:42), historical evidence shows that in the United States, at 
least on several occasions prior to recessions, long-term interest rates fell below short-
term rates (yield curve inverts). In fact, Dueker shows that by 1997 the yield curve had 
become inverted prior to all five recessions that had occurred in the country since 1960. 
Several studies provide the same observation in other countries3 Estrella and Mishkin 
(1996:23) observe that the yield curve as a recession predictor outperforms many highly 
regarded forecasting measures including the Commerce Department's index of leading 
indicators and the movement in stock prices. Bernard and Gerlach (1996:4) also highlight 
a major attraction of the yield curve as a forecasting tool. They note that interest rate data 
is instantaneously available, it is never revised and the availability of data at both short 
and long term maturities makes it possible to forecast for long horizons. 
Since 1980, periods identified by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) as official 
recessions have been preceded by an inverted yield curve. Due to the fact that the country 
possesses highly developed financial markets, financial indicators such as bond yields 
should provide valuable information about the state of the economy. The theoretical 
justification for the use of the slope of the yield curve to predict economic activity can be 
found in the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates. This theory 
assumes that long-term interest rates represent weighted averages of expected future 
short-term interest rates and, as such, spreads between rates of different maturities are 
interpreted as expectations of future rates corresponding to the period between the two 
maturities (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:45). 
Given the forward looking nature of financial markets, expectations about future interest 
rates should, in tum, reflect expectations about future real economic activity. Since 
several empirical studies have shown the usefulness of the yield curve in predicting 
future macroeconomic conditions in various countries, . one might also want to model the 
business cycle in South Africa using the slope of the yield curve. 
l Amongst the studies are Ivanova et al (2000) for Germany, Moneta (2003) for Euroland, Atta-Mensah 
and Tkacz (1998) for Canada. 
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1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Government policy aims to deliver long-term sustainable and non-inflationary growth 
and, as such, endeavours to avoid periods of recession. It is for this reason that 
policymakers are always looking for information that will make them predict future 
economic conditions. Turning points in the business cycle (peaks and troughs) are hard to 
forecast and economists have a bad record with regard to predicting recessions. Since 
business cycle peaks are seldom predicted in advance, this normally leads to misguided 
policies. 
A central bank that has missed the business cycle peak may continue tightening monetary 
policy in its fight against inflation and this could weaken economic growth further. The 
central bank's credibility will be compromised, as it will be seen as 'behind the curve'. 
Investors who have missed the turning point in the business cycle will invest in the wrong 
asset classes and thus sustain losses. Businesses will continue investing to increase 
capacity if they do not anticipate a recession and only realise late that demand for their 
goods has actually slowed down. 
An accurate prediction of the business cycle turning points can be useful. Economic 
conditions sometimes change fast and unpredictably. Investment decisions are made with 
reference to future economic conditions and the clearer the crystal ball, the wiser the 
decision (Del Negro, 200 I: 1). From a policy perspective, if recessions can be 
successfull y predicted a number of quarters in advance, this would represent a signal for 
a future rise in the output gap and a possible fall in inflation and monetary policy could 
then respond accordingly (Atta-Mensah and Tkacz, 1998:3). 
Since changes in monetary policy affect real activity by a lag of 18 to 24 months, it is 
necessary for the South African Reserve Bank to accurately predict turning points in 
economic activity. This is of major importance to the central bank since it emphasises 
pre-emptive monetary policy. Based on the relationship between asset prices and the 
11 
business cycle, investors and portfolio managers can improve their asset allocation 
decisions by knowing when prices will reach their maximum and minimum levels 
(Moolman, 2002:44). A better understanding of the relationship between the term 
structure of interest rates and economic activity might also provide us with an insight into 
the way securities are priced in financial markets4 This is important for fixed income 
portfolio managers and bond traders. 
Since several studies have shown that the slope of the yield curve provides a significant 
amount of information about future economic activity, and the yield slope outperforms 
other indicators in predicting recessions, the question is to what extent does the yield 
curve predict economic activity in South Africa? If the yield spread contains information 
about future economic conditions, does it do better than other financial variables in 
predicting recessions? Lastly, since the slope of the yield curve is indirectly influenced by 
the central bank, does monetary policy have an effect on the business cycle? 
1.3 GOALS OF THE RESEARCH 
The major objective of this dissertation is to study the ability of the yield curve to predict 
business cycle turning points in South Africa and to compare its predictive power with 
that of other economic indicators. To achieve this main objective, the following specific 
objectives will be pursued; 
(a) To provide an overview of the relationship between the slope of the 
yield curve and the business cycle to assess if the yield spread provides 
any information about the business cycle; 
4 The yield curve can also be seen as representing the tem1 structure of interest rates, which can be defined 
as the relationship between interest rates on financial instruments, and the maturities of those instruments 
(Mishkin 2004: 127). 
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(b) To use movements in stock prices, growth in money supply and the 
index of leading economic indicators to estimate the probability of the 
economy going into recession and to assess if any of these indicators 
perform better than the yield curve; 
(c) To assess if monetary policy is responsible for the yield curve's 
predictive power with regard to future economic activity; 
(d) Based on the analysis, to draw conclusions on the information 
provided by the yield curve for monetary policy, investment decision-
making and fixed income portfolio management. 
1.4 JUSTIFICATION FOR THE STUDY 
Although evidence on the predictive power of the yield curve is abundant, studies on the 
relationship between the slope of the yield curve and economic activity in South Africa 
are limited. Nel (\996) uses cointegration techniques to study the relationship between 
the tenn structure of interest rates and economic activity in South Africa and finds that 
the slope of the yield curve is positively related to the growth in real economic activity. 
Nel only studies the relationship between the yield curve and economic activity and does 
not use the yield spread to predict the business cycle. Also, his study only covers the 
period between 1974 and 1993 and as such, seems outdated since major structural 
changes took place in South Africa's economy since 1994. 
Moolman (2002) uses data from 1979 to 2001 and a probit model to show that the term 
structure of interest rates can be used to predict turning points of the South African 
business cycle and specifically models the likelihood of the economy going into recession 
given the slope of the yield curves. Moolman only uses the slope of the yield curve to 
S Several authors, including Moolman (2002:44), do not differentiate between the term structure of interest 
rates and the yield spread. 
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predict recessions and does not compare its performance with other financial indicators to 
see if the yield spread does better. Several studies in other countries show that economic 
indicators like stock prices, money supply growth, leading economic indicator indices, 
spreads between government and commercial paper and foreign term spreads also 
possess useful information for predicting the business cycle (see Dueker, 1997; EstreJla 
and Mishkin, 1998; Atta-Mensah and Tkacz, 1998; Moneta, 2003). It would be 
interesting to find out if such variables perform better than the yield spread in predicting 
recessions in South Africa. One other limitation of Moolman's study is that it does not 
cover one crucial period (2003) when the yield curve inverts but the economy does not go 
into recession. 
Both Nel and Moolman's studies provide evidence that the yield curve possesses 
information in South Africa about economic activity and can therefore be used by both 
policymakers and the private sector in decision making. This study aims to fiJI the gap in 
the literature by comparing the predictive power of the yield curve with that of other 
variables that include changes in stock prices, money supply growth and the index of 
leading economic indicators. In addition, a modified probit model that includes a lagged-
dependent variable is employed to find out if the results obtained from the simple model 
improve. Lastly, an analysis is made to ascertain if the yield spread's predictive power 
represents only the effect of monetary policy. The results of the study should also be of 
interest to countries closely linked to South Africa, especiaJly countries in the Common 
Monetary Area (CMA). 
The existence of large-scale macro econometric models and experienced professional 
forecasters may render the use of observing a single financial variable like the yield 
spread too simplistic. Besides gaining knowledge about the yield curve itself, 
policymakers and market participants can benefit in several ways from this approach 
(Haubrich and Dombrosky, 1996:27). Predictions made using the yield spread may be 
used as a check on the complex models and judgemental forecasts and perhaps highlight 
where causal relationships or assumptions need rethinking. On the one hand, if 
predictions from the model are in agreement with the financial indicator, confidence in 
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the model is enhanced. On the other hand, getting different results from the two methods 
may signal a need to review the assumptions that led to the prediction. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1 Data Types and Sources 
Data on the yield curve is the monthly average of the yield spread between the IO-year 
RSA government bond and the 91 days RSA government Treasury Bill. Data on share 
prices represents yearly percentage changes in the JSE All-share index and figures on 
money supply are year-on-year growth rate in real M3. The series on the repo rate 
represents the SARB's repurchase rate (formerly bank rate). All the above series were 
obtained from the Quoin Institute, RSA. Data on the business cycle represents periods 
identified by the SARB as official upswings and downswings. Data on the index of 
leading economic indicators is the percentage change in the index over 12 months. The 
series on the business cycle and the index of leading indicators were obtained from the 
SARB. 
1.5.2 Method of Analysis 
Descriptive statistics (graphs) will be used to explore the relationship between the 
business cycle and each of the variables. The aim is to assess if there is any observable 
trend of each variable along the business cycle phases. An econometric model (probit 
model) is used to estimate the probability of recessions given each of the variables. The 
study presents in-sample forecasts for each of the variables used. 
1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Several variables can be used to model the business cycle. The study concentrates on the 
predictive power of the yield curve. The yield slope is represented by the nominal yield 
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spread between the 10-year government bond and the 3-month Treasury Bill. The study 
aims to directly estimate the likelihood of the economy going into recession given the 
yield spread. The performance of the yield curve is compared with that of the three 
variables mentioned above (stock prices, real M3 and the index of leading economic 
indicators). Monthly data covering the period January 1980 to June 2004 is used. 
1.7 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
Following this introductory chapter that lays the foundation and major objectives of the 
research, the rest of the study is organised as follows: 
Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical foundation of the study. The theories of the business 
cycle and the term structure of interest rates are explained, followed by an analysis of the 
theoretical relationship between the business cycle and the yield curve. The chapter also 
reviews previous studies on the use of the yield curve to predict economic activity. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of South Africa's economy over the period studied with 
an emphasis on the business cycle. An analysis of the relationship between the variables 
studied and the business cycle is presented. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology of the study. The individual variables and the data 
used in the study are explained. The probit model and its specification are presented. The 
method used is reviewed, evaluated and justified. 
Chapter 5 gives the empirical evidence and the results from the estimated probit model 
are explained. The chapter assesses whether the variables studied predict the business 
cycle, and a comparison of their predictive power is presented. 
Chapter 6 concludes the study. Recommendations are presented on the usefulness of 
financial variables in predicting the business cycle and its role in monetary policy 
formulation and investment decision-making. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERA TURE REVIEW 
2.1 THEORETICAL ISSUES 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The first objective of this study is to provide an overview of the relationship between the 
business cycle and the yield curve in South Africa. Understanding such a relationship 
requires knowledge of the theories behind both the business cycle and the yield curve. 
This chapter therefore sets out the theoretical foundation of the study and explains the 
economic theories behind the yield curve and the business cycle. The theoretical 
relationship between the two variables covered in this chapter should enable us to 
understand why the slope of the yield curve can be used to predict economic activity. 
This chapter also explores the empirical literature on the ability of the yield curve to 
predict economic activity; the theoretical relationship between the two variables and the 
methods used to predict the business cycle given the yield spread. Business cycle theory 
is considered first. 
2.1.2 Business cycle theory 
The observation that the aggregate economy does not climb on a steady trend but 
experiences occasional booms of activity and recessions is as old as the economics 
profession itself (Laubscher, 2004:22). Generally, the business cycle can be defined as 
the sequence of economic activity typically characterised by recession, fiscal recovery, 
growth and fiscal decline. Bums and Mitchell (1946, in Del Negro, 2002:3), some of the 
pioneers of studies on cyclical fluctuations in economies, say the business cycle consists 
of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed by 
similar general contractions. Each cycle consists of four phases: a lower turning point 
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(trough), an expansion, an upper turning point (peak) and a contraction. Business cycle 
literature distinguishes between classical business cycles and growth cycles (Laubscher, 
2004:22). 
The classical business cycle is a type of fluctuation in aggregate economic activity 
consisting of expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, 
followed by similar general recessions and revivals which merge into the expansion 
phase of the next cycle. Such changes in economic activity are recurrent but non-periodic 
and vary from one to twelve years in duration (Smit and Van der Walt, 1982:49). A 
growth cycle can be defined as the fluctuation of the general economic growth rate 
around the long-term potential rate of growth, with such fluctuations being recurrent but 
not periodic (Laubscher, 2004:22). 
For the purposes of this study, cyclical movements in economic activity in South Africa 
will refer to the business cycle in both classical and growth cycle terms. There are several 
competing theories of the business cycle, and despite the age of the debate, there is little 
consensus on the causes of cyclical fluctuations in the economy. Business cycle theory 
has evolved from the belief that cyclical fluctuations in the economy are caused by 
factors inherent in the economic system and as such, the economy will forever move in a 
cycle, to theories that attribute the business cycle to random shocks that move the 
economy away from its full employment level. Since such a debate is intense and beyond 
the scope of this paper, the main theories of the business cycle will be mentioned. 
According to ChatteIjee (2000: I), "early analysts of the business cycle believed that each 
cyclical phase of the economy carries with it the seed that generates the next cyclical 
phase. A boom generates the next recession; that recession generates the next boom; and 
the economy is forever caught in a self-sustaining cycle." This view of the business cycle 
was too broad and simplified and emphasised only self-sustaining behaviour. ChatteIjee 
argues that a major implication of this view is that the economy cannot deliver stable and 
sustainable economic performance and therefore calls for aggressive countercyclical 
policies that are aimed at smoothening out the cycle. 
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The shock-based theory of the business cycle is based on the premise that there always 
exists a full employment level of economic activity, which the economy could 
theoretically always achieve (Romer, 1993:3). The full employment level of output tends 
to grow as the population rises and new technologies are discovered, and if nothing 
disturbs the economy, this level can be maintained forever. Business cycles therefore 
occur because the economy is occasionally disrupted by large shocks that force it to move 
temporarily away from the full employment level (Fuhrer, 1998: 10). This view of the 
causes of the business cycle emphasises the effect of exogenous influences on the 
economic system that drive it away from its optimal potential and implies that without 
shocks there are no business cycles. Examples of such shocks can include terrorist 
attacks, drastic changes in weather, oil price shocks, balance of payments crises, rapid 
inflation, changes in money supply etc. Recent examples of exogenous shocks that have 
impacted heavily on economic activity have been the speculative capital flows to 
emerging markets that triggered severe recessions in a number of Asian economies in the 
late 1990s and the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001. Attributing 
economic fluctuations to shocks implies that we cannot predict the business cycle and 
thus counter-cyclical policies can never work. 
Monetary theorists put a great emphasis on the observed relationship between changes in 
money supply and changes in national income, and given this, they believe that monetary 
policy is at the heart of the business cycle (Hardwick et aI., 1990:404). Monetary policy 
can be defined as the government's attempts to influence aggregate demand in the 
economy by regUlating the cost and availability of credit. Former SARB Governor Dr 
Chris Stals noted "there is a definite relationship between developments in real economic 
activity (the business cycle) and in the financial aggregates relevant for monetary policy" 
(Stals,1997:1). 
Central banks, in their pursuit of long-run price stability, have played a significant role in 
causing many recessions (Fuhrer 1998:2). Since an ultra-loose monetary policy is 
normally associated with upswings in economic activity and tight monetary policy with 
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contractions in GDP growth, we may infer that erratic monetary policy could cause 
fluctuations in economic activity (Macfarlane, 1993:4). Romer (1993:4) observes that 
monetary policy appears to have played a crucial role in causing business cycles in the 
United States since World War II. This theory of the business cycle also has its 
shortcomings. 
Macfarlane (1993:9) points out that since cycles occur in all countries and business 
cycles across countries tend to be highly correlated, does it mean that all countries go 
through a series of policy errors? Fuhrer (1998:2) notes that it is important to distinguish 
the systematic response of monetary policy to existing conditions from the policy regime 
shifts and exogenous shocks. During the emerging market crisis of 1996/1997, the SARB 
hiked interest rates aggressively in an effort to defend the rand from speculative attacks 
and the economy slipped into a recession later on. Can we therefore safely assume that it 
was monetary policy or the speculative attacks (external shock) that caused the recession? 
These are some of the conflicting issues with regard to the causes of the business cycle. 
Real business cycle theory is the latest attempt by economists at explaining cyclical 
fluctuations in the economy. Real business cycle theorists believe the business cycle 
would occur even if there were no monetary and financial disturbances such that 
countercyclical policies play no role at all (Chatterjee, 1999:2). This theory suggests that 
changes in productivity explain the cyclical movements in economic activity. Such 
productivity changes arise because of improvements in technology and workers' skills. 
Real business cycle theory assumes the important driver of the business cycle is the rate 
of change in technology that affects the supply side of the economy (Fuhrer, 1998:2). 
Fuhrer notes that technological changes are highly and positively correlated to output and 
business cycles and as such cause fluctuations in economic activity. The most 
controversial aspect of real business cycle theory is that it ascribes no importance to 
countercyclical policies and assumes that some policies aimed at reducing the severity of 
business cycles may worsen the situation (Chatterjee, 1999:2). 
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On the whole, a number of factors lie behind the business cycle and such factors are 
equally important. Laubscher (2004:23) concludes that business cycles are shaped by 
both external and internal developments and propagated by some endogenous law of 
regularity. Although business cycle theories differ on the causes of the cyclical 
fluctuations, what is noteworthy from the debate is that several consistent observations 
have been made by the various studies. Pradhan (2001 :23) summarises the 'stylized facts' 
(observations made consistently over a long period of time) of business cycles and some 
of them are listed below: 
• Upswings and downswings caused by the business cycle affect the entire 
economy and not only a few industries. 
• Business cycles follow a similar pattern (boom, slowdown, receSSIOn, 
recovery) but the length of each cycle is unknown and cannot be predicted 
with certainty. 
• Production data provides a good idea of the part of the business cycle the 
economy is in. For example, if production is rising, it can be inferred that 
GDP will rise. 
• A slowdown in GDP is normally preceded by a decline in the growth rate 
of money supply. (Causation is not implied here since this presents part of 
the debate on the causes of the business cycle). 
• Inflation responds to changes in the growth rate of money supply after a 
lag such that a reduction in money supply growth is followed by a decline 
in inflation after a period of time. 
• A consistent rise in the stock market usually indicates the economy will 
perform better in the near future. Causation is also not implied in this case 
since stock prices also react to the current performance of the economy. 
• Nominal interest rates increase after the economy begins a boom and start 
falling once the economy experiences a slowdown. Such a relationship 
also has implications about expected inflation. When the economy enters a 
boom period, people expect prices and inflation to start increasing and as 
such nominal interest rates will rise. 
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• A large fluctuation in the GDP of large countries affects the GDP of their 
trading partners. 
If all the theories that explain the business cycle agree on the various and consistent 
observations stated above, rather than join the debate on the causes of the business cycle, 
it makes sense to use the 'stylized facts' to try and predict the business cycle. This paper 
therefore uses the observed relationship between the business cycle and nominal interest 
rates to predict future economic activity. The shape of the yield curve represents the 
movement of nominal interest rates in the study. Since monetary policy influences the 
level of interest rates, it is not implied at this stage that monetary policy causes the 
business cycle. This issue will be tackled at a later stage. 
The next section reviews yield curve theory. 
2.1.3 Yield curve theory 
2.1.3.1 Introduction 
It is generally accepted that the yield curve, which is representative of the term structure 
of interest rates, possesses valuable information about the course of the business cycle 
(Nel, 1996: 162). Mishkin defines the yield curve as the plot of yields on bonds with 
different terms to maturity but the same risk, liquidity and tax considerations and it 
describes the ternl structure of interest rates for particular types of bonds, such as 
government bonds6 (2004: 127). Since the yield curve shows the relationship between 
yields and the term to maturity, the spread between short-term and long-term interest 
rates can also be seen as representative of the term structure of interest rates. The 
important issue on term structure discussions is the effect that term to maturity has on 
6 Mishkin (2004: 120) also defines the tenn structure of interest rates as the relationship among interest rates 
on bonds wi th different tenns to maturity. 
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yields when all other possible explanations for yield variations have been removed 
(Howells and Bain, 1998: 183). 
Nel (1996: 163) summarizes the relationship between the business cycle and the yield 
curve and concludes that the term structure of interest rates embodies market expectations 
about future economic activity. In an economic upswing, long-term interest rates 
normally exceed short-term rates and the yield curve is upward sloping and positively 
shaped. As the economy approaches its peak and during the initial stages of the 
slowdown, the yield curve inverts (yield curve assumes negative slope) such that short-
term rates exceed long-term interest rates. This would imply that by studying the changes 
in the shape or slope of the yield curve, it should be possible to predict future economic 
conditions. Theoretically, why should this happen? This question is tackled next. 
Firstly, the main theories that explain why yields should vary with the term to maturity 
are covered. 
2.1.3.2 Term Structure Theories 
A review of interest rate fundamentals is necessary for one to understand why the yield 
curve can be used to forecast the business cycle. Theories of the term structure of interest 
rates explain the shape of the yield curve. More often than not, the yield curve slopes 
upward, indicating that long-term securities offer higher yields than short-term securities, 
although the curve can be downward-sloping (inverse), virtually flat across all maturities 
or display a hump in a certain maturity range (Santomero and Babbel, 2001:78). 
Mishkin and Eakins (1998: 147) point out that a good theory of the term structure of 
interest rates must explain the following three important empirical observations about 
yield curves: interest rates on bonds of different maturities tend to move together over 
time; yield curves usually slope upward; and when short-term interest rates are low, yield 
curves are more likely to have a steep upward slope, whereas when short-term rates are 
high, yield curves are more likely to be inverted. Three main theories explain the term 
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structure of interest rates, i.e. the relationship between interest rates on bonds of different 
maturities reflected in yield curve patterns. These are the expectations theory, the 
segmented markets theory and the liquidity premium theory (Mishkin, 2004: 128). The 
preferred habitat hypothesis is closely linked to the liquidity premium theory. 
2.1.3.2.1171e expectations hypothesis 
The expectations hypothesis can be regarded as the classical theory of the term structure 
and it holds the view that the slope of the yield curve depends exclusively upon the 
expectations of the capital market about future interest rates (Dodds and Ford, 1974:18). 
This theory assumes that the yield on a long-term bond equals the average of the 
expected interest rates on short-term bonds. The central hypothesis of the expectations 
theory is that long-term interest rates are an average of current and expected future one-
year interest rates (Van Zyl et al., 2003 :41). The key assumption behind this theory is that 
all securities in a given risk class, regardless of their maturity, are perfect substitutes and 
thus the expected return on these bonds is equal. Bond investors therefore do not prefer 
securities of one maturity over another and thus they will not hold any bond if its 
expected return is less than that of another bond with a different maturity (Mishkin and 
Eakins, 1998: 149). 
If the expectations hypothesis is correct, the slope of the yield curve can be used to 
forecast the future path of interest rates . The theory provides an explanation of why the 
term structure of interest rates changes at different times. Since the yield curve is derived 
directly from the market's estimates of future short-term interest rates, daily movements 
in the yield curve reflect changes in the market's expectations about future short-term 
interest rates. An upward sloping yield curve, as per the expectations theory, suggests that 
short-term interest rates are expected to rise in the future. A flat yield curve suggests 
short-term interest rates are expected to remain constant whilst a downward sloping or 
inverted yield curve implies that, on average, the market expects short-term interest rates 
to decline in the future. A humped yield curve would mean that short-term interest rates 
are expected to increase first and then fall. 
24 
The expectations hypothesis explains the fact that interest rates on bonds with different 
maturities move together over time (Mishkin, 2004: 132). Historically, an increase in 
short-term interest rates has led to higher interest rates in the future, and since long-term 
rates are the average of expected future short-term rates, short and long-term interest rates 
tend to move together. The expectations theory also explains the tendency of the yield 
curve to slope downwards when interest rates are at historical highs and to slope upwards 
when rates are at the bottom of their range (Howells and Bain, 1998: 187). 
The above fact can be explained with the concept that investors perceive a range of 
'normal' interest rates to which they expect future rates to return whenever current rates 
are at or outside the limits of this range. Therefore, when short-term rates are low, 
investors expect them to rise to some normal level in the future, and thus the average of 
future expected short-term rates is high relative to the current short-term rate. The yield 
curve will therefore slope upwards as long-term interest rates will be above current short-
term rates. When short-term rates are high, there will be a general expectation for them to 
come back down to their normal level and long-term rates will then drop below the 
current short-term rate and the yield curve will become inverted. 
The expectations theory also explains another important fact about the term structure of 
interest rates. If interest rates are mean reverting, (i.e. they tend to return to their normal 
levels if they are either unusually high or low), it implies that long-term rates will have a 
lower volatility than short-term rates since they represent an average of the future short-
term rates (Mishkin, 2004: 132). The major shortcoming of the expectations theory is that 
it does not explain the classical shape of the term structure, that is, the typical yield curve 
tends to be upward sloping. Does this mean there are in-built biases towards a positively 
shaped yield curve due to other factors not related to interest rate expectations, or are 
investors simply wrong on the average? According to the expectations hypothesis, short-
term rates are just as likely to rise, as they are to fall. 
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2.1.3.2.2 The liquidity premium theory 
The term (liquidity) premium theory of the term structure explains the yield curve's 
historical tendency to slope upwards (positive slope) except when interest rates are at 
very high levels, indicating that, as a general rule, bonds with longer maturities offer 
higher yields (Howells and Bain, 1998:188). This theory states that the interest rate on a 
long-term bond equals an average of short-term rates expected to occur over the life of 
the bond plus a liquidity premium (also called a term premium) that responds to supply 
and demand conditions of that bond (Mishkin, 2004: 133). 
The liquidity premIUm theory's key assumption is that, although bonds of different 
maturities are substitutes, they are not perfect substitutes. Since bond prices fluctuate 
with interest rates and the interest elasticity increases with a bond's duration, longer-term 
debt securities tend to have more volatile prices than short-term securities. Investors 
therefore tend to prefer short-term bonds since they bear less interest rate risk. The term 
premium theory therefore argues that investors must be paid an extra return in the form of 
an interest rate premium to encourage them to buy long-term bonds and compensate them 
for the increased risk (Van Zyl et al., 2003:43). 
Closely associated with this theory is the preferred habitat hypothesis, which assumes 
that investors have a preference for bonds of one maturity over another, i.e. a particular 
maturity segment (preferred habitat) in which they prefer to invest (Mishkin, 2004: 134). 
Such investors will be tempted to move away from their preferred maturity sector only if 
they will earn a higher return. Since investors are more likely to prefer the habitat of 
short-term bonds (due to interest rate risk), they will be willing to hold long-term bonds if 
they offer higher expected returns. This fact explains the tendency of the yield curve to 
slope upwards. The term premium increases with term to maturity as investors demand 
extra compensation for having to invest in their less preferred maturities. 
The term premium and preferred habitat theories recognise the important role played by 
expectations in influencing the shape of the yield curve. The shape of the yield curve is 
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therefore determined by expectations about future short-term interest rates plus a liquidity 
or term premium that compensates investors to invest in long-term bonds or to move 
away from their preferred habitat. These theories explain the facts that interest rates on 
different maturity bonds move together over time, yield curves tend to have an upward 
slope when short-term interest rates are low and to be inverted when short-term rates are 
high. 
The tendency of the yield curve to typically slope upward is explained by investors' 
preferences for short-term bonds and the fact that the liquidity premium is always 
positive and increases with term to maturity (Mishkin, 2004: 134). A downward sloping 
yield curve would arise in instances when market expectations of lower short-term rates 
in the future are so high that they far outweigh the term premium. 
2.1.3.2.3 The segmented markets theory 
The market segmentation theory of the term structure asswnes that markets for different 
maturity bonds are completely separate and segmented (Mishkin and Eakins, 1998: 151). 
The segmentation occurs because investors are interested in different aspects of securities 
rather than yields alone. The main assumption of this theory is that bonds of different 
maturities are not substitutes at all and the expected return from holding a bond of one 
maturity has no effect on the demand for a bond of another maturity. 
The segmentation theory holds that investors have specific investment preferences that 
are ultimately dictated by the nature of their liabilities (Howells and Bain, 1998: 190). 
Investors will therefore concentrate in a particular segment of the yield curve mainly to 
hedge their liabilities and to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. A common 
example involves pension funds and insurance companies who have long-term liabilities 
and mainly invest at the longer end of the yield curve to try and match the duration of 
their liabilities. 
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According to the market segmentation theory, the slope of the yield curve is influenced 
by the demand for and supply of bonds within each maturity segment. This theory can 
explain why the yield curve will normally slope upwards since investors generally prefer 
securities with shorter maturities because of their lower interest rate risk. Long-term 
bonds will have higher yields due to their lower demand since investors prefer short-term 
bonds. This theory, however, does not explain why bonds of different maturities move 
together since it assumes the yield curve in each submarket is set in isolation from the 
yields in all other markets. The theory can also not explain why yield curves tend to slope 
upwards when short-term interest rates are low and to be inverted when short-term 
interest rates are high. 
A combination of all the assumptions underlying the theories of the term structure gives 
us a more complete understanding of the factors that shape the yield curve. The liquidity 
premium and preferred habitat theories explain all the three empirical facts about the term 
structure and are thus widely accepted (Mishkin, 2004: 137). These theories maintain that 
the interest rate on a long-term bond equals the average of the short-term interest rates 
expected to prevail over the life of the bond plus a liquidity or term premium, and thus 
these theories contain features of both the expectations and segmented market theories. 
All these theories, however, cannot explain the origin of interest rates and only account 
for the relationship between the various rates along the term structure. 
It is widely accepted in economics that monetary authorities directly control the short end 
of the yield curve. Central banks, in pursuit of their monetary policy objectives, set the 
interest rate for overnight funds and are therefore responsible for explaining the 
movements in the short end of the yield curve. In South Afiica, the SARB sets the repo 
rate for accommodation to the banking system and this influences overnight call rates 
(the lowest point on the yield curve). In the United States (US), the Federal Reserve sets 
the federal funds rate for overnight loans of reserves between banks. Financial market 
expectations about future economic activity, future levels of inflation, demand and supply 
concerns and the expected future path of short-term interest rates contribute to the 
determination of long-term interest rates. The central banks therefore influence the long 
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end of the yield curve indirectly through the effects of monetary policy on the expected 
rate of inflation and economic activity. Since interest rates are the key monetary policy 
tool for fighting inflation and can also be used to stabilise output and employment, 
changes in short-term interest rates change expectations about the future levels of 
inflation, output and employment and hence the future level of short-term interest rates. 
2.1.4 Explaining the shape of the yield curve and economic activity 
The theories of the yield curve can help one make predictions about the movement of 
short-term interest rates in the future. An upward sloping yield curve would suggest 
short-term interest rates are expected to rise, an inverted yield curve would imply short-
term rates are expected to fall and a flat one would mean that rates are not expected to 
change in the future. According to Stojanovic and Vaughan (1997:11), market 
expectations about future interest rates also reflect expectations about future real 
economic activity and monetary policy. This gives rise to the relationship between the 
slope of the yield curve and the business cycle as determined by the expectations of 
future short-term interest rates. 
If the term structure of interest rates reflects in part the collective forecast of expected 
inflation, it must also reflect investors' assessments of future real economic growth and 
interest rates. Interest rates fluctuate over the business cycle. Normally, interest rates are 
high at the peak of an expansion, they fall as the economy contracts, are at their lowest 
levels as the economy reaches a recession and rise again as the economy expands 
(Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991 :566). 
Several studies (especially in the US) have shown that the yield curve inverts prior to 
recessions (see Stojanovic and Vaughan, 1997:10 and Dueker, \997:42). This typically 
occurs several months or quarters before the onset of the recession. Since interest rate 
cycles normally lead the business cycle, can we safely assume that an inverted yield 
curve signals a recession? This question will be answered towards the end of the 
dissertation. Since the main objective of this study is to assess the ability of the yield 
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curve to forecast recessions, it is necessary to explain theoretically why the yield curve 
would invert before a recession. Moneta (2003: 10) argues that there are three main 
reasons that explain the relationship between the term structure of interest rates and 
economic growth that make the yield curve contain information about future recessions. 
These are market expectations about future interest rates, monetary policy effects and 
investor hedging. 
Moneta suggests that a positive relationship exists between the yield curve and economic 
growth. This relationship is mainly reflected in the expectations of financial market 
participants about future economic growth. An upward or 'normal' yield curve is 
associated with an increase in real economic activity whilst a negative yield curve is 
associated with a decline in real economic activity (Moneta, 2003: I 0). 
The causes of the theoretical relationship between the yield curve and economic activity 
are discussed next. 
2.1.4.1 Market expectations about future interest rates 
The expectations hypothesis gives one explanation for the relationship between the yield 
curve and the business cycle (Karunaratne, 1999:2, Moolman, 2002:44). Since the 
expectations hypothesis assumes long-term interest rates represent the average of future 
expected short-term rates, long-term interest rates have embedded expectations about 
future economic activity. As investors anticipate that a recession is close, the response of 
the yield curve will depend on their assessment of the magnitude and duration of the 
recession's effect on short-term interest rates (Dueker, 1997:42). Generally, investors 
would expect short-term interest rates to fall during a recession. The expectation of lower 
interest rates may be due to an expectation of a counter-cyclical monetary policy 
designed to stimulate the economy, lower real rates of return, low inflation or a 
combination of these factors (Moneta, 2003: 10). 
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In any of the cases mentioned above, if the expectations hypothesis holds, long-term 
interest rates should fall to take into account the lower short-term rates that are expected 
to prevail during the recession, thus causing the yield curve to flatten and then finally 
become inverted prior to the recession. On the other hand, market expectations of an 
economic recovery would cause the yield curve to exhibit a positive slope that steepens 
further as the economy powers ahead due to expectations of higher inflation and a tight 
monetary policy. 
2.1.4.2 Monetary policy effects 
The effect of monetary policy is clearly evident in the term structure of interest rates. One 
major importance of the yield curve is that it is an important mechanism for the 
transmission of monetary policy (Gowland, 1991 :207). Central banks normally operate 
on the short end of the yield curve and therefore are only able to directly influence short-
term interest rates. A combination of factors determines long-term interest rates. Since 
most forms of economic activity are influenced by long-term interest rates, the effect of 
monetary policy on aggregate demand will depend on how changes in short-term interest 
rates affects the longer end of the yield curve (Gowland, 1991 :208). The impact of 
monetary policy therefore depends upon the nature of the term structure relationship, or 
specifically the slope of the yield curve. 
The effects of monetary policy on the yield curve can also explrun the relationship 
between the term structure of interest rates and the business cycle. Most central banks 
presently use interest rates as their key monetary policy tool with the ultimate objective 
of fighting inflation. When monetary policy is tightened through a hike in short-term 
interest rates, long-term interest rates will typically rise but usually by less than the 
change in the current short-term rate and thus lead to a flattening of the yield curve 
(Bernard and Gerlach, 1998:5). This could be due, in one instance, to an 
acknowledgement of the central bank's credibility in fighting inflation by the financial 
markets. The credibility of a central bank's monetary policy affects the way in which the 
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yield curve changes shape in response to a change in short-term interest rates (Wesso, 
2000:76). 
If the SARB hikes short-term interest rates and the yield curve flattens (i.e. the spread 
between short-term and long-term interest rates declines), this would imply that markets 
expect inflation to decline in the future and short-term interest rates to come down again. 
Since a monetary policy contraction can reduce spending in some parts of the economy 
and cause economic growth to slow down, if investors believe the SARB's actions could 
trigger a recession in the months ahead, the yield curve could flatten and eventually 
become inverted due to the increased probability of a recession (Moolman, 2002:45). An 
ultra loose monetary policy on the other hand could trigger an economic expansion and 
ignite fears of inflation in the months ahead thus causing the yield curve to steepen and 
show a positive slope. 
2.1.4.3 Investor hedging 
The maximisation of consumer choices can be seen as the third reason for the relationship 
between the yield curve and economic activity (Moneta, 2003: II). The preference for a 
stable level of income rather than a very high income during an expansion and a very low 
income during slowdowns will cause consumers to hedge against recessions (Moolman, 
2002:44). If there is a general agreement in the financial markets that the economy is 
heading for a slowdown, investors may shift their funds into financial instruments such as 
long-term bonds that will deliver payoffs during the recession. The rush for long-term 
bonds will cause their prices to rise (and their yields to decline). Further, to finance their 
purchases of long-term bonds, investors will liquidate their holdings of short-term 
instruments and their yields will rise. The shifting of funds from short-term to long-term 
securities in anticipation of a recession will cause the yield curve to invert. This intuition 
is sometimes referred to as the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model and assumes 
movements in asset prices are associated with developments in economic activity 
(Alessandrini, 2003:3). 
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Expectations of an economic expansion will, on the other hand, cause investors to shift 
funds to short-term securities thus causing the yield curve to steepen and show a positive 
slope. The increased demand for long-term securities when a recession is anticipated can 
also be explained by the duration effect on fixed income instruments. Since long-term 
bonds have a higher duration, when the central bank loosens monetary policy during the 
slowdown, the prices of long-term securities will rise by a higher margin than short-term 
bonds and thus deliver a higher payoff. 
Although several studies have shown that slope of the term structure contains information 
about future economic activity, no formal economic theory or model provides a reason 
for this (Dotsey, 1998:31 , Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994: 138). The slope of the yield 
curve contains information on a number of economic variables and is presumably 
influenced by the path of expected inflation, expected real interest rates and risk 
premiums (Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994: 138). Changes in any of these variables will 
therefore cause the slope of the yield curve to change. Deliberate actions of central banks 
directly affect short-term interest rates. It is market expectations about the future levels of 
inflation, interest rates and economic activity that cause changes in long-term interest 
rates and hence the slope ofthe yield curve. 
Expectations of higher inflation may cause the yield curve to steepen and this may 
prompt the SARB to hike short-tenn interest rates. In most cases, long-term rates will rise 
by a lesser margin than short-term interest rates and the yield curve would flatten. As 
inflationary expectations subside, the yield curve will invert thus prompting the tight 
monetary policy to cause a recession (Dotsey, 1998:37). Weak economic growth and low 
inflation expectations on the other hand may cause the central bank to cut short-term 
interest rates and this can cause the yield curve to steepen. High economic growth can 
lead to higher expected inflation and the yield curve may steepen further. 
The next section reviews the literature on previous studies that tested the ability of the 
yield curve to predict economic growth and the likelihood of recessions. 
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2.2 EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Several studies have documented the strong predictive power of the slope of the term 
structure or the yield spread for future inflation, interest rates, the growth rate of real 
output and the timing of recessions. Since the major objective of this paper is to study the 
ability of the yield curve to predict recessions, this literature review focuses on studies 
that provide evidence on the information content of the yield spread with regard to 
economic activity. Studies on the use of econometric models to predict future economic 
activity have focused on two approaches. 
The first one is predicting the future values of economic variables, one of which could be 
real GDP growth (see Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Haubrich and Dombrosky, 1996; 
Bonser-Neal and Morley, 1997) and the other method is to build a model that focuses on 
directly predicting the event of interest. The event of interest in this case would be the 
turning point in economic activity (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and 
Mishkin, 1998; Bernard and Gerlach, 1996). Predicting turning points is a by-product of 
the first type of models, whilst for the second category it is the ultimate goal of the 
model. Particular attention is paid to studies that determine whether the yield curve can 
predict the timing of recessions, since this is the main objective of the dissertation. For 
the yield spread to be able to predict recessions, it should also be in a position to forecast 
real GDP growth rates. Before reviewing evidence on the yield curve's ability to forecast 
recessions, its ability to predict real GOP growth is considered. 
2.2.2 Forecasting real economic growth 
There is a significant amount of empirical evidence (especially in the US) suggesting that 
a relationship exists between the future rate of growth in real GDP and the current slope 
of the yield curve. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991), using US figures from 1955 to 1988, 
present evidence that the slope of the term structure can predict cumulative changes in 
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output for up to four years in the future and successive marginal changes in real output up 
to a year-and-a-half into the future. They use a simple econometric model to regress real 
GDP data on a yield curve represented by the yield difference between the 10-year 
government bond rate and the 3-months Treasury bill. They run in-sample forecasts using 
quarterly data for periods up to 20 quarters ahead. Estrella and Hardouvelis find that a 
steeper yield curve implies faster economic growth in the future whilst a flatter curve is 
associated with a slower growth in real output. They also observe that the slope of the 
yield curve outperforms variables such as lagged output growth, lagged inflation, the 
index of leading indicators and the level of real short-tenn interest rates in predicting real 
output growth. 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991:566) also seek to find out if the slope of the yield curve 
reflects the effects of monetary policy only or if it reflects the influence of other factors 
besides monetary policy. They address this issue by adding the current level of the short-
tenn rate to their simple regression and check to see if the yield spread continues to have 
statistically significant coefficients at the various forecasting horizons. Their study 
indicates that the information on the slope of the yield curve is mostly about variables 
other than current or expected monetary policy, as the predictive power of the slope 
remains almost intact. They argue that this feature of the term structure makes it provide 
useful information for central banks in their efforts to stabilize output and employment. 
Theoretically, they acknowledge the responsibility of current and expected future 
monetary policy on the predictive power of the yield curve but they fail to state the other 
variables that they cite as more important. 
Plosser and Rouwenhorst (1994) study the information contained in the term structure 
about future real economic growth in the US, UK and Germany and seek to find whether 
movements of short term interest rates, current and expected monetary policy explain the 
predictive content of the yield curve. They find evidence that the yield curve has 
predictive power for real economic growth as measured by the growth rate of industrial 
production in the US and Germany and to a lesser extent the UK. The weaker predictive 
power for the UK was explained by the fact that inflation was both higher and more 
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variable in the sample period, thus obscuring the information in the term structure about 
real activity. They offer support to Estrella and Hardouvelis' (1991) findings that the 
slope of the yield curve contains information about future real activity that is independent 
of current or future monetary policy. They state that the yield curve does contain 
information about the future path of monetary policy but there is also a component of the 
spread that is useful for predicting real economic activity. Plosser and Rouwenhorst 
(1994: 138) argue that the nominal term structure predicts future economic activity 
presumably because the path of expected inflation, expected real interest rates and risk 
premiums influences it. 
Haubrich and Dombrosky (1996) follow on the work of Estrella and Hardouvelis and use 
a basic model designed to predict GDP growth in the US four quarters into the future 
based on the current yield spread. Their sample runs from 1961:1 to 1995:3 and a 
qualitative analysis of their data revealed a positive relationship between real GDP 
growth and the lagged yield spread. They observe that a decline in real GDP growth is 
usually preceded by a decrease in the yield spread and a narrowing yield spread often 
signals a decrease in real GDP growth. An increase in the yield spread, on the other hand, 
is associated with higher real GDP growth. 
Their study also shows that an inverted yield curve usually (but not always) precedes a 
recession7• Their econometric model confirms the observation that the IO-year-3-month 
yield spread has significant predictive power for real GDP growth. However, Haubrich 
and Dombrosky also observe that the performance of the yield curve in the last decade 
had deteriorated, maybe due to a change in the relationship between the yield spread and 
economic activity (Haubrich and Dombrosky 1996: 34). 
Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997) search for evidence on the usefulness of the yield curve 
as a predictor of real economic activity outside the United States. They evaluate the 
ability of the yield curve to forecast real economic growth in Austria, Canada, France, 
7 Although the 1990-91 recession was preceded by a flat yield curve, this was viewed as a dramatic change 
in its shape and hence quite informative in its own right. 
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Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Using 
data from 1971 to 1996, they model changes in real GDP growth or Industrial Production 
on the yield spread and generate in-sample and out-of-sample forecasts. Their results also 
indicated that the yield spread is a significant predictor of economic activity across the 
countries concerned over the next I, 2 and 3 years and provide evidence of the term 
structure's predictive power outside the US (Bonser-Neal and Morley 1997:48). 
Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997:38) came up with the following observations: increases in 
the yield spread are followed by increases in real economic growth whilst decreases in 
the spread are followed by decreases in economic growth; the size of the spread is related 
to the level of economic growth, i. e. the larger the spread, the higher is the future level of 
real economic growth; and lastly, the strength of the relationship between the slope of the 
yield curve and future real economic growth varies across the eleven countries studied. 
They therefore conclude that the evidence on the predictive power of the yield curve for 
future economic activity seems almost well established. 
According to Bonser-Neal and Morley (1997:39) two main explanations exist for the 
empirical relationship between the yield slope and economic activity. Firstly, the yield 
curve reflects the central bank's monetary policy stance. When short-term interest rates 
are hiked, long-term interest rates typically rise usually by a lesser amount and as a result 
the yield spread narrows and even becomes negative. Higher interest rates may reduce 
spending in some sectors of the economy and cause real economic growth to decline. As 
a result, a negative yield spread will normally be associated with slower real economic 
growth in the future. 
The second explanation for the link between the slope of the yield curve and future 
economic growth stems from the hypothesis that the yield spread reflects market 
expectations about future economic growth. An expectation of higher economic growth 
in the future may lead to an increase in demand for credit fTom both the business and 
consumer sectors. Since borrowing will normally be long-term, there will be an increase 
in the supply of long-term bonds and this will cause their prices to fall. Long-term 
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interest rates will rise relative to short-tenn rates and the yield curve will steepen. 
Expectations of higher inflation due to increasing demand pressures will cause the yield 
curve to steepen further. 
Several other papers investigate the yield curve's predictive power and find that the 
spread is a useful indicator of future real economic activity. Such papers, include among 
others, Hu (1993), Cozier and Tkacz (1994), Kozicki (1997), Smets and Tsatsaronis 
(1997) and Dotsey (1998). Although such evidence is abundant, it is unfortunate that it 
comes mainly from the United States and other highly developed countries. One 
interesting feature of the study on the relationship between the yield curve and economic 
activity has been the yield spread's ability to forecast the timing or likelihood of 
receSSlOns. 
Evidence on the ability of the yield curve to predict recessions is presented next. 
2.2.3 Forecasting recessions 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) were the frontrunners in the study of the yield curve as a 
forecasting tool for predicting recessions. Using US data for the period 1955 to 1988, 
they first show that the yield spread between the lO-year Treasury bond and the 3-
months Treasury bill is a useful indicator for future economic growth rates. Further, they 
propose that the yield curve may indicate more accurately when drastic changes in output 
occur. They argue that the yield curve may be a predictor of a binary variable (X,) that 
indicates the presence or absence of a recession. Estrella and Hardouvelis estimate a 
nonlinear econometric model (probit model) that relates the indicator (X,) to the slope of 
the yield curve lagged four quarters. Their model estimates the probability of a recession 
as dated by the National Bureau of Economic research (NBER) during the present quarter 
to the slope of the yield curve four quarters earlier. 
Estrella and Hardouvelis find that the yield spread forecasts recessions in the US up to 
four quarters ahead. Their study shows that a negative relationship exists between the 
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slope of the yield curve lagged four quarters and the probability of a recession in the 
present quarter. This means that an increase in the spread between long-term and short-
term interest rates would lead to a decrease in the probability of a recession four quarters 
later. Generally, this would mean that a steepening of the yield curve implies increasing 
chances of higher economic growth four quarters later and a downward sloping yield 
curve means a higher probability of a recessionS. This lends support to the observation 
that the yield curve normally inverts prior to recessions. 
Estrella and Mishkin (1996) also use a probit model to examine the usefulness of the US 
yield cwve in predicting recessions and compare its predictive power with other financial 
and macroeconomic variables used to predict economic events. They follow Estrella and 
Hardouvelis (1991) and use a probit model to estimate the probability of the economy 
going into recession given the various indicators. Using data from QI: 1960 to QI: 1995, 
they find that the yield spread between the 10-year government bond and 3-month 
Treasury bill has a useful role in macroeconomic prediction and that it outperforms other 
highly regarded forecasting measures including the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
stock price index, the Commerce Department's index of leading indicators and the Stock-
Watson index of economic indicators. 
Estrella and Mishkin (1996:4) observe two important facts about the performance of the 
four variables studied: all the variables have a forecasting ability one quarter ahead but 
the leading economic indicator indices produce the best forecasts over this horizon, and 
the perfonnance of the yield cwve dominates the other variables as the forecast horizon is 
increased to two and four quarters. They conclude that the yield spread can have a useful 
role in macroeconomic forecasting, especially with longer lead times. Since the yield 
curve is relatively quick and simple to use, they also argue that it can be used to 
supplement econometric and judgmental predictions. Getting similar results from the 
macroeconomic forecasting model and the yield cwve can enhance confidence in the 
model whilst if the yield curve indicator gives a different signal, a review of the 
8 When the yield curve steepens, the spread between short-tenn and long-tenn bonds widens and when the 
yield curve flattens, the spread declines. 
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assumptions behind the model may be necessary (Estrella and Mishkin, 1996:5). 
According to Estrella and Mishkin (l996:2), current monetary policy, expectations of 
future inflation and real interest rates contained in the yield spread seem to play an 
important role in the prediction of economic activity. 
Bernard and Gerlach (1996:22) investigate the ability of the term structure to predict the 
probability of a recession within the following eight quarters in several countries. The 
countries studied include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the 
UK and the US. They also seek to find whether foreign spreads are useful in predicting 
domestic recessions since the movement in tenn spreads and economic activity tends to 
be correlated across countries. Using data covering the period 1972 to 1993, they apply 
the standard probit model to determine the probability of a recession given the spread of 
the yield curve. Their findings provide further evidence of the yield curve's predictive 
power even outside the United States. 
Bernard and Gerlach (1996:22) come up with four major findings from their study: the 
slope of the domestic yield curve provides information about the likelihood of recessions 
in all eight countries; term spreads in some countries contain information for predicting 
recessions as much as six to eight quarters ahead; while German and US spreads were 
frequently significant in the regressions of other countries, the added information was 
limited except in the UK and Japan; and lastly, while leading indicators contain 
information not included in the term spread, this information is only useful for 
forecasting recessions in the immediate future. 
Dueker (l997) provides further evidence of the ability of the yield curve to forecast 
recessions in the US. Using data from 1959 to 1995, he also applies a probit model to 
determine the timing of recessions and compares the forecasting performance of the 
Commerce Department's index ofleading indicators, real M2 growth, the spread between 
6-months Commercial Paper and 6-months TB rates, the percentage change in the S&P 
500 stock index and the spread between 3D-year Treasury bonds and 3-month Treasury 
Bills. Dueker also introduces a modified probit model that includes a lagged dependent 
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variable and introduces a Markov-switching coefficient variable in the model to confirm 
the results of the standard probit model (Dueker, 1997:45). 
Dueker's results also indicate that the yield spread remains the best recession predictor 
amongst the examined set of indicators even under the extension of the basic probit 
model. He finds that the term spread performs better than the autoregressive series of the 
state of the economy, and the forecast accuracy, only at one quarter forecast horizon, was 
improved with the addition of the last variable. Dueker's findings strengthen the claim 
that the yield curve is a useful indicator and he concludes that the term structure has two 
properties that make it a favorable recession predictor. Firstly, the yield curve is readily 
available and gives a signal that is easy to interpret, and secondly, the expectations 
hypothesis of the term structure provides a theoretical foundation for the predictive power 
of the yield curve. 
Estrella and Mishkin (1998) extend their 1996 study and examine the performance of 
various macroeconomic and financial variables in predicting future US recessions. The 
variables studied include the stock price indices (Dow Jones Industrial Average, NYSE 
Composite and S&P 500), lOyear-3months yield spread, 6-months Commercial Paper 
and TB spread, monetary aggregates (MO, Ml, M2, M3), macroeconomic indicators 
(growth in real GDP, CPl, Purchasing Manager's survey) and indices of leading 
economic indicators (Commerce Department's index of leading indicators, Stock and 
Watson's 1989 index and Stock and Watson's 1993 index). Standard probit models were 
used in the study using data from 1959 to 1995. 
Their results show that the indices of leading indicators have a strong predictive power 
for short horizons, especially one quarter ahead. The spread of the yield curve possesses 
the best performance across all other horizons, followed by the stock price indices. 
Estrella and Mishkin conclude that the two variables (yield spread and stock prices) may 
be observed individually over their respective primary horizons or they may be combined 
to produce a more reliable simple model. They find that such indicators can supplement 
macroeconomic models and judgmental forecasts and can serve as "quick and reliable 
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checks of more elaborate predictions" (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:55). Estrella and 
Mishkin also perform out-of-sample forecasts of the various variables studied in an effort 
to confirm their in-sample forecasts. They discover that the in-sample forecasts are 
confirmed by out-of-sample predictions but the performance of the variables showed 
some deterioration in terms of both accuracy and length of predictive horizon. 
Atta-Mensah and Tkacz (1998) follow closely the technique employed by Estrella and 
Mishkin (1996) and use a probit model to examine the performance of selected financial 
variables in predicting recessions in Canada. Their results are similar to findings made in 
the US (Estrella and Mishkin, 1996; Dueker, 1997) and in Europe (Bernard and Gerlach, 
1996) that the spread between Canadian long bonds and the 90-day Commercial Paper 
rate is best at predicting recessions in Canada when compared to other financial variables 
like stock indexes and money supply. In-sample forecasts of the yield curve's predictive 
power are also confirmed by out-of-sample forecasts. However, they observe that one 
drawback to their model was the lack of a dynamic structure and suggested that one 
might include a lagged dependent variable in the model as suggested by Dueker to 
address this shortcoming. 
Karunaratne (1999) demonstrates that the yield curve, represented by the difference in 
yields between the lO-year bond rate and the 90-day bank bill rate, correctly predicts 
economic activity in Australia and a probit modelling of recessions reveals that the 
inverted slope of the yield curve provides reliable forecasts of recessions four quarters 
ahead. Karunaratne further finds that the forecasting power of the yield spread improves 
dramatically when the probit model is enhanced by a dynamic lag structure as per 
Dueker's (1999:12) recommendation. The stylized relationship between the yield spread 
and economic activity is explained by the expectations, liquidity preference, preferred 
habitat, monetary policy stance and consumption-smoothing hypotheses (Karunaratne, 
1999:2). 
Ivanova et al. (2000:) study the comparative performance of a number of interest rate 
spreads as predictors of German inflation and the business cycle. They study yield 
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spreads between 1-2 years and 9-10 years government bonds (public term structure 
spread), 1-2 years and 9-10 years bank bonds (bank term structure spread), 1-2 year bank 
bonds and 1-2 years government bonds (bank-public spread), the spread between the 
Lombard rate9 and 9-10 years government bonds and the spread between the call rate and 
9-10 years government bonds (both called term structure series). They use quarterly data 
over the period 1973:4 to 1998:2 and applied a two-regime Markov-switch model that 
allows the dynamic behaviour of the economy to vary between expansions and 
recessions. 
The findings of Ivanova et at. (2000:54) confirm the usefulness of yield spreads for 
forecasting inflation cycles and economic downturns in Germany. Ivanova et al. 
(2000:55) observe that the bank term structure, public term structure and the spread based 
on the call rate predicted all recessions with a comfortable lead, although they lagged 
some of the recoveries by a few months. The spread between 1-2 year bank bonds and 1-
2 year government bonds generated a series of false signals and the spread series based 
on the Lombard rate performed notably worse than the three market based series, 
implying that "the source of predictive power of market rate spreads is the information 
they contain about factors independent of monetary policy. 
Moneta (2003) studies the informational content of the slope of the yield curve as a 
predictor of recessions in the euro area. The historical predictive powers of ten yield 
spreads for different segments of the yield curve are tested using two forms of the probit 
model. Using quarterly data over the period 1970: I to 2002:2, Moneta estimates the 
standard probit model proposed by Estrella and Hardouvelis (1996) and the modified 
probit model with a lagged dependent variable suggested by Dueker (1997). He finds that 
the yield spread can be used to forecast recessions in the euro area and the best predictor 
is the spread between the 10-year and 3-month yields. According to Moneta (2003:43) 
the use of a lagged dependent variable only helps to forecast recessions in the immediate 
term. 
, This is the rate at which the Bundesbank (Gennan central bank) provides loans to banks secured against 
high quality paper (Bloomberg definition). 
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Moneta also compares the predictive power of the yield spread with other variables 
including the OEeD composite leading indicator for the euro area, the quarterly growth 
rate of the stock index and the GDP growth rate. He finds the yield curve to be the most 
powerful predictor of recessions in the euro area for horizons beyond one quarter, and 
most importantly for up to four quarters, which is the most important forecast horizon for 
monetary policy. Moneta's conclusion is that the simple probit model with only the 10-
year minus 3-months spread as an explanatory variable appears to be fairly reliable in 
predicting recessions in the euro area and its short-run forecasting ability is improved by 
adding the autoregressive series of the state of the economy. Moneta (2003:24) also finds 
that out-of-sample forecasts confirm the in-sample predictions but the best forecasting lag 
declines from four to two quarters. 
Empirical work in South Africa on the relationship between the term structure of interest 
rates and economic activity is quite limited. Nel (1996) specifies and tests the relationship 
between the term structure of interest rates and growth in real economic activity. 
Employing data covering the period 1974 to 1993, Nel uses cointegration techniques to 
model the course of the business cycle with respect to the spread between the long-term 
government bond and the 3-months TB rate. Nel (1996: 168) discovers that the slope is 
positively related to growth in real economic activity and concludes that the yield curve 
contains information about the real sector of the economy and may be used to forecast 
future economic activity. 
Moolman (2002) uses a probit model to predict turning points of the South African 
business cycle based on its relationship with the term structure of interest rates. Quarterly 
data for the period 1979:1 to 2001:3 is used in the analysis and Moolman estimates the 
probability of the economy going into recession given the slope of the yield curve. The 
results from the study show that the probability of a recession in a specific quarter is a 
negative function of the yield spread lagged two quarters. The results indicate that the 
yield curve successfully predicts turning points of the business cycle two quarters ahead. 
The forecasting horizon of the yield curve (according to Moolman's study) seems to be 
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shorter in South Africa as most studies (especially in the US and Europe) point out that 
the yield curve gives its best results in a forecasting horizon offour to eight quarters. 
Several other studies (see Stojanovic and Vaughan, 1997; Dotsey, 1998; Alessandrini, 
2003) provide empirical evidence that the term structure of interest rates, as represented 
by the spread between short-term and long-term bond yields, correctly predicts the 
likelihood of recessions. The simple probit model, with only the term spread as an 
explanatory variable, appears to be fairly reliable in terms of forecasting recessions. 
Adding a dynamic lag structure to the simple probit model only improves the forecasting 
power of the spread over the short term (Dueker, 1997; Moneta, 2003). Most studies 
(especially in the US and Europe) show that the slope of the yield curve outperforms 
other financial variables and economic indicators in predicting recessions, especially for 
horizons beyond one quarter. Other financial indicators that feature prominently in the 
studies are changes in stock prices, the index of leading economic indicators, changes in 
real money supply growth, and the credit spread between government paper and 
commercial paper. 
Although the observation that the yield spread provides useful information for predicting 
economic activity and the likelihood of recessions is almost well established, the theory 
that explains such a relationship remains somewhat rudimentary (Alessandrini, 2003:3). 
Since monetary policy has an influence on the slope of the yield curve, it is not surprising 
that several authors acknowledge the effects of current and expected monetary policy in 
explaining why the yield spread should forecast recessions (see Estrella and Hardouvelis, 
1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1996; Moneta, 2003). It is also generally accepted in the 
literature that monetary policy effects do not fully account for the yield curve's predictive 
power. 
Closely associated with monetary policy is the role played by the expectations hypothesis 
in explaining the forecasting ability of the yield curve. A change in monetary policy can 
alter the expectations of individuals about the future level of interest rates, inflation and 
in tum real economic activity. The Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model provides 
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another theoretical explanation and assumes that households seek to maximize their 
utility by smoothening out their consumption path over time. When investors purchase 
financial assets like bonds, they substitute current for future consumption, and as such 
they form expectations about the future state of the economy (Alessandrini, 2003:3). 
Such expectations are reflected in the prices of the financial assets and this in turn leads 
to the forecasts for future economic conditions. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the literature. First and most 
importantly, the slope of the yield curve, as represented by the yield spread between 
short-term and long-term interest rates provides valuable information about future rates 
of real GDP growth and the likelihood of recessions. The theoretical justification for the 
spread's predictive power comes from the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, 
monetary policy and the Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (Stojanovic and 
Vaughan, 1997; Bernard and Gerlach, 1998; Moneta, 2003). 
Secondly, although empirical evidence on the yield curve's predictive power is clearly 
abundant, most studies were done in the United States (for example Estrella and 
Hardouvelis, 1991; Estrella and Mishkin, 1996; Haubrich and Dombrosky, 1996) and 
Europe (see Plosser and Rouwenhorst, 1994; Bernard and Gerlach, 1996; Bonser-Neal 
and Morley, 1997; Moneta, 2003) with limited evidence from emerging markets. With 
regard to forecasting real GDP growth, simple regressions of GDP on the yield spread 
consistently provide sufficient results. 
The standard probit model dominates and provides consistent results for studies that 
forecast the likelihood of recessions. Other variables that feature in the literature as useful 
indicators for future economic activity are the movements in stock prices, changes in 
money supply, the index of leading economic indicators and the credit spread between 
commercial and government paper. The yield spread between lO-year bonds and 3-month 
treasury bills outperforms all other yield curve segments and economic indicators in 
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predicting the likelihood of recessions, especially at longer forecasting horizons (see 
Dueker, 1997; Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Atta-Mensah and Tkacz, 1998; Moneta, 
2003). Lastly, only a limited number of the studies confirm their in-sample forecasts with 
out-of-sample predictions. 
The major aim of this study is to examine the ability of the yield curve to predict business 
cycle turning points in South Africa with an emphasis on the likelihood of recessions. 
From the literature review, it is clear that the yield curve is widely accepted as a 
forecasting tool and can also be used in South Africa. Evidence on the yield curve's 
predictive power is limited in South Africa and a comparison of the performance of the 
yield spread to other variables has not been documented. 
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CHAPTER 3 
SOUTH AFRICA'S BUSINESS CYCLE SINCE THE EARLY 
1980s 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to achieve the objective of this study as stated earlier, it is necessary to provide 
an overview of the country's business cycle and its relationship with the yield curve. This 
chapter analyses South Africa's business cycle since the early 1980s, focusing on 
prominent features of the business cycle and the relationship between the yield spread 
and the business cycle. Since the forecasting power of the yield curve is compared with 
that of changes in stock prices, money supply and the index of leading economic 
indicators, the relationship between the business cycle and each of the variables is also 
presented in the chapter. 
3.2 BUSINESS CYCLE PHASES 
The South African Reserve Bank has used various methods to determine the upper and 
lower turning points of South Africa's business cycle since 1946 (Venter and Pretorius, 
200 I :63). Measuring the business cycle from peak to peak, South Africa is currently in 
the upward phase of the fourth business cycle since the early 1980s (see Table I). 
Table 1 Business Cycle Phases of South Africa since 1981 
Business Downward Length Upward Length 
Cycle Phase (Months) Phase (Months) 
1 Sept 81 - Mar 83 19 Apr 83 - Jun 84 15 
2 Jul 84 - Mar 86 21 Apr 86 - Feb 89 35 
3 Mar 89 - May 93 51 Jun 93 - Nov 96 42 
4 Dec 96 - Aug 99 33 Sept 99 -now 60-plus 
SOUTce: SARB Quarterly Bulletm, March 2003 
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The SARB uses the growth cycle for analyzing cyclical fluctuations in economic activity 
and for determining the reference turning points in the business .cycle lO (Smit and Van der 
Walt, 1982:50). The downward phase of the business cycle would be associated with 
declining growth rates that are below the long-term growth potential. Such growth rates 
will decline until they become negative and the economy will be in a recession when two 
consecutive quarters of a decline in real GDP are experienced. When the economy enters 
its downward phase, the possibility of a recession therefore increases. Once in a 
recession, the turning point in the business cycle will be marked by the first of two 
consecutive quarters of real GDP growth. The business cycle will assume its upward 
phase where growth rates will exceed the long-term growth potential (see Van der Walt, 
1982:50 and Laubscher, 2004:22). 
Laubscher (2004:25) notes that the first most important fact about South Africa's 
business cycle (especially in the 1980s) is its close correlation with the global business 
cycle; i.e. the domestic cycle is largely influenced by developments abroad. Laubscher 
uses the relationship between G7 countries' Industrial Production and South Africa's 
domestic coincident business cycles indicator to demonstrate that the country's business 
is influenced by fluctuating economic conditions in industrial countries. He argues, "as a 
supplier of commodity inputs to the major industrial country production processes, 
business cycle developments in these countries were rapidly transmitted to South Africa" 
(2004:26). 
3.2.1 The Business Cycle in the 1980s 
The September 1981 to March 1983 downswing phase of South Africa's business cycle 
was mainly attributed to the slowdown experienced by the United States and other 
industrial countries as a result of the first oil shock (SARB, 1982: I). The global 
slowdown was reflected in declining exports from RSA. The huge decline in the gold 
10 A growth cycle refers to the fluctuation of economic activity around a long-tenn growth trend 
(Laubscher, 2004:22). 
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price in the early 80s also contributed to a great extent to the slowdown in South Africa 
since the economy was largely dependent on gold exports. According to the IMF 
(2002: 125), emerging market economies like South Africa are highly vulnerable to 
commodity price shocks because they specialize in commodity exports and are also 
dependent on commodity inputs, especially oil. The drought experienced in the early 
1980s also had an adverse effect on agricultural output and the domestic economy 
(SARB, 1983:1). The SARB noted that a recovery in the gold price and global demand 
was necessary for the economy to recover from its slump. The downswing lasted for 19 
months and the trough was reached in March 1983. 
The business cycle changed in the second quarter of 1983 with an increase in domestic 
demand rather than a recovery in exports driving the recovery and transferring the 
economy into the upswing phase of the business cycle. Real private and government 
consumption expenditure were the main forces behind the upswing phase of the business 
cycle (SARB, 1984: 1). Excessive money creation brought about by a decline in interest 
rates since 1983 supported the upswing (SARB, 1984:20). Export growth also started 
responding to the recovery in the industrial nations and this lent further support to the 
recovery in South Africa. 
The high level of domestic expenditure, however, led to increases in inflation, a weakness 
in the balance of payments and a sharp depreciation of the rand. The above factors, which 
started appearing in the fourth quarter of 1983, coupled with a further decline in the 
dollar price of gold and a persistent drought, presented problems for the economy and 
required countercyclical policies (SARB, 1984:20). The SARB started tightening 
monetary policy from 1983 and this led to a decline in money supply and in turn, private 
consumption expenditure. Government consumption expenditure moderated in the period 
also reflecting the restrictive policy measures. 
The gradual tightening of monetary policy and further restrictive fiscal policy measures 
caused the business cycle to change and the upswing, which had been in progress from 
the second quarter of 1983, gave way to a downswing in the third quarter of 1984. 
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According to the SARB (1984: 1), the corrective policy measures were a result of the 
"unsustainability of the economic upswing which had largely been based on an increase 
in government and private consumption expenditure". The countercyclical policies that 
include tighter monetary policy and fiscal restraint were therefore behind the downswing 
observed from July 1984. Stals (1995:3) notes that the 1980s economic recovery was not 
sustainable because of the following major constraints: balance of payments problems 
due to the country 's inability to attract capital inflows; excessive reliance on bank credit 
to finance an expansion due to a low savings rate; and lastly, the lack of stability in 
financial markets due to an ultra loose monetary policy. He concluded that a correction 
of the above deficiencies was necessary for the economy to maintain a long-term positive 
growth path. 
The cyclical downturn observed since mid 1984 began to level out in the third quarter of 
1985 and the economy improved in several aspects. Money supply was brought under 
control, domestic savings increased, the current account in the balance of payments 
started showing surpluses and credit demand started weakening (SARB, 1985:6). The 
SARB started to lower interest rates gradually in 1985 and the Ministry of Finance 
embarked on various fiscal measures aimed at promoting an economic recovery. The 
business cycle eventually changed and assumed an upward phase in April 1986. 
Other features of the upswmg phase in 1987 were an expansIOn m real private 
consumption expenditure, an increase in real fixed capital formation and an improvement 
in the exchange rate that was largely helped by an increase in the gold price (SARB, 
1987:3). The country was however not spared from the stock market crash of 1987 that 
led to the re-rating of equity values worldwide and a slowdown in the global economy. 
The economy reached a peak in February 1989 and according to the SARB (1989:3), the 
fading of growth momentum in the South African economy from the fourth quarter of 
1988 presented the outcome of self-generating business cycle forces and was further 
manifested by more stringent monetary and fiscal policies from the end of 1987 and early 
1988. 
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3.2.2 The Business Cycle in the 1990s 
The March 1989 to November 1996 (peak to peak) business cycle covers the important 
period of political change in South Africa and presents an interesting case of whether 
endogenous cyclical forces or exogenous factors drive the business cycle (Laubscher, 
2004:27). Another interesting question would be whether a structural change in South 
Africa's economy is observable in this period. The downward phase observed from 1989 
to 1993 was the longest since the 1980s and had both exogenous and endogenous 
components. Both phases of the cycle (upswing and downswing) had characteristics 
similar to the business cycle observed in the 1980s. The slowdown was driven by a 
protracted world economic recession, a persistent drought in the region (including South 
Africa) and a restrictive monetary policy in response to inflationary pressures and balance 
of payments concerns. A recovery in the world economy, an end to the drought and an 
increase in commodities prices (including gold) helped the economy to recover and 
assume an upward phase in the second quarter of 1993. This upturn was briefly 
interrupted in early 1994 during the political transition due mainly to labour-market 
turmoil but the economy regained its momentum in the second half of the year. 
According to Pretorius et al. (1999:40), the upswing that started in 1993 was 
accompanied by key structural changes in the economy that were supportive for growth 
in the long term. These included the end of economic sanctions after the first democratic 
election in 1994, the gradual liberalization of exchange controls and improved financial 
stability as reflected by a slowdown in inflation. Other key drivers of the upswing were 
domestic fixed investment and private consumption expenditure, all of which resulted 
from increasing business and consumer confidence. Government consumption 
expenditure was also a feature of the upswing but to a lesser extent as the government 
changed its priorities to focus on fiscal discipline and reducing the budget deficit. The 
upswing led to a strong growth in credit extension and money supply and this prompted 
the SARB to start hiking interest rates in an effort to counter inflationary effects of the 
upswing. 
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A key structural change observed in the country in the second half of 1994 was that the 
current account of the balance of payments was allowed to go into deficit without 
restricting economic growth (Pretorius et al., 1999:41). This was due to the fact that 
South Africa started attracting net capital inflows that were used to offset the deficit on 
the current account. The key problem with the inflows was that the country mainly 
attracted portfolio capital flows that had high volatility characteristics. This became 
evident in 1996 when the inflows were interrupted following speculative attacks on the 
currency. The rand depreciated heavily following the reversal of the portfolio inflows and 
the SARB hiked interest rates in an effort to bring stability in the markets. The above 
developments signalled an end to the upswing phase and by 1997 the cooling down of the 
economy was evident in low levels of output growth, weaker growth in real domestic 
expenditure and falling inventory levels (Pretorius et al" 1999:42). 
The reprieve in the balance of payments seen in 1994 was short lived and signalled that 
integration with the world economy meant the country was now more vulnerable to 
international shocks. According to the SARB, the business cycle turned in December 
1996 and assumed a new downward phase. The slowdown in economic activity that 
began in December 1996 was characterized by a decline in domestic demand that was 
attributed mainly to a fall in both household and government consumption expenditure. 
The decline in government expenditure was a reflection of the government's commitment 
to reducing the budget deficit and redressing macroeconomic imbalances in the economy. 
In 1998, several emergmg market economIes m Asia came under severe financial 
pressure that spilled over to South Africa. The country's financial markets were adversely 
affected as capital flew out of the country, the rand depreciated heavily and liquidity 
conditions tightened. The SARB responded to the crisis by hiking interest rates in an 
effort to stabilize the markets and prevent capital outflows. These events, coupled with a 
steep decline in commodity prices and demand from Asia, prolonged the downward 
phase and delayed the recovery in economic activity (Venter and Pretorius, 2001:68). 
53 
The emerging market crisis ended towards late 1998. Monetary conditions eased from 
October, capital inflows were observed in early 1999, commodity prices improved, 
business confidence rose and the volume of exports started to increase in 1999. The 
SARB lowered interest rates and by July 1999, the level of interest rates was below levels 
seen before the financial market turmoil of 1998 (Venter and Pretorius, 200 I :68). A 
recovery in commodity prices and fast expansion in world economic activity following 
the Asian crisis led to an improvement in the South African economy. The weaker rand 
also benefited the country's export sector. According to the SARB, the economy reached 
a lower turning point of its business cycle in August 1999 and went into a new upward 
phase. 
The present economic upswing (as of 2005), which commenced during the third quarter 
of 1999, represents the longest period of uninterrupted quarter-on-quarter growth since 
1960 (SARB, 2004:3). From 1999, the upswing was led by a decline in interest rates and 
a big improvement in world economic activity in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. A 
sudden downward change in the outlook for the world economy towards the end of 2000, 
declining business and consumer confidence in RSA and a sharp depreciation of the rand 
to record lows in 2001 all did not bode well for the RSA economy but South Africa was 
able to cushion itself from all the negative factors. 
Although the world economy experienced a major slowdown in 2001 with several 
industrial countries going into recession, the domestic economy was able to weather the 
storm. Laubscher (2004:32) notes that the resilience in South Africa' s economic growth 
in the face of a global recession in 200 I was in sharp contrast to earlier periods of equally 
weak economic growth. He argues that the resilience reflects "a stronger endogenous 
growth momentum in the economy that is less dependent on the global economic cycle" 
and attributes this to improved productivity and profitability levels in the corporate 
sector, steady cumulative growth in after tax real incomes, moderately stimulatory fiscal 
and monetary policies and more competitive exports. 
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It is quite evident from the above discussion that South Africa's business cycle is driven 
by both exogenous and endogenous factors. In the early 1980s, the South African 
economy was mainly export oriented with the domestic business cycle closely linked 
with that of the major industrial nations. The international commodity prices cycle also 
exerted a strong influence on the domestic business cycle, mainly because of the 
country's reliance on gold exports. It is also worth noting that an economic expansion 
was not sustainable in this period since it led to inflationary pressures and balance of 
payments concerns. This always made it necessary for policymakers to introduce counter-
cyclical policies aimed at addressing these problems. An export-led expansion therefore 
had to be stopped at some point using anti-expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. 
Although the business cycle is still influenced to some extent by global economic 
conditions, the domestic economy has recently shown a strong endogenous component 
that makes it resilient to adverse global cyclical fluctuations. Laubscher (2004:33) argues 
that such resilience provides evidence of a structural change in the economy due to 
corrective macroeconomic policies implemented after 1994. Evidence of such resilience 
is provided by the fact that the economy survived the global recession of 200 I. The 
emerging market crisis of 1998 should, however, remind us that a greater integration with 
the world economy makes the country more vulnerable to international shocks. Since the 
country still attracts huge capital inflows in the form of portfolio capital that is highly 
reversible on changes in investor sentiment, a reversal of these flows would have far 
reaching consequences. The country is however in a better position now to deal with 
situations similar to the Asian crisis of 1998 due to several factors that work in its favour. 
Such factors, which also support the endogenous component of the economy, include 
prudent macroeconomic policies, fiscal discipline, a clear and austere monetary policy 
framework, a high level of foreign exchange reserves and high business and consumer 
confidence levels. 
The next section reviews the relationship between the yield curve and the business cycle 
in South Africa. 
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3.3 THE YIELD SPREAD AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN RSA 
Figure 1 
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Historical experience (especially in the US and Europe) provides evidence that on several 
occasions prior to recessions, long-term interest rates have fallen below short-term 
interest rates such that the yield curve became inverted (an inverted yield curve is 
represented by a negative spread between long-term and short-term interest rates). Figure 
1 shows the movement of the yield curve represented by the spread between yields on the 
10-year government bond and the 91-day Treasury bill rate over the various phases of the 
business cycle in South Africa since 1980. The shaded areas denote the periods identified 
by the South African Reserve Bank as official downswing phases of the business cycle. 
Figure 1 illustrates that since 1980 the yield curve had become inverted prior to all four 
downswings. This is the key feature of the yield curve identified in several studies that 
makes the yield spread a valuable indicator for the likelihood of recessions. Before the 
first downswing phase of the business cycle (September 81 - March 83), the spread 
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between long-tenn and short-tenn interest rates declined steeply, and the yield curve 
finally became inverted in December 1981. The economy went into recession in the 
second quarter of 1982, i. e. two quarters after the yield curve inverted H The upswing 
phase observed from April 1983 to June 1984 was quite short (only 15 months) and the 
yield spread remained negative almost throughout this period indicating that the upswing 
was not sustainable. The yield spread became negative in June 1983 whilst the economy 
officially went into recession in the second quarter of 1985 i.e. three quarters later12 . 
The upswing observed from April 1986 to February 1989 was associated with a 
positively sloped yield curve with the spread between the 10-year government bond and 
the 3-months Treasury bill rising to reach a peak in February 1988. The yield spread 
started declining in March 1988 with the yield curve finally inverting in February 1989 to 
coincide with the start of the downswing phase of the business cycle as identified by the 
SARB. The economy went into recession in the second quarter of 1990 (i.e. four quarters 
after the yield curve inverted). The downswing from March 1989 to May 1993 was the 
longest (it lasted 51 months) in the period studied. The spread remained negative until 
December 1992 where the yield curve changed and assumed a positive shape. This 
signalled an end to the downswing phase and that an upturn was imminent. According to 
the SARB, the economy reached a trough in April 1993 with the business cycle changing 
to the next upswing phase. This further confinned that the change in the shape of the 
yield curve correctly predicted the change in the course of the business cycle. 
In the upward phase of the business cycle observed from June 1993 to November 1996, 
the yield spread gradually increased and reached a peak in August 1994, where it started 
falling. The yield curve briefly inverted in December 1995 but remained almost flat until 
November 1996 when long-tenn interest rates went below short-tenn rates to coincide 
with the start of the downswing phase in December 1996. The yield spread remained 
negative until February 1999 to signal the downswing phase was nearing its end. 
11 The conventional definition of two consecutive quarters of negative growth in real GDP is used to 
describe a recession in this case, 
12 Although the economy officially went into recession in Q2 1985, the downswing phase commenced in 
July 1984. 
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Although the economy never reached an official recession in this period, real GDP 
growth declined substantially and was below the average growth rates of around 3.5% 
observed earlier in the period. The inversion of the yield curve did indicate the outlook 
for a below par performance of the economy. 
The yield curve changed to exhibit a normal positive shape in March 1999 and the 
economy entered the upswing phase of the business cycle in September 1999. In this 
upswing phase of the business cycle, the yield spread peaked in April 2000 and started 
narrowing from May onwards. The decline in the spread between 2000 and 2001 
reflected the negative outlook for both the world and South African economies. Although 
the world economy went into recession in 2001, South Africa was able to achieve 
positive real GDP growth in its economy (real GDP growth however declined between 
Q3 and Q4 2001). 
The above analysis provides evidence that a relationship indeed exists in South Africa 
between the yield spread (representing the yield difference between short-term and long-
term interest rates) and the various phases of the business cycle. An observation of the 
changes in the shape of the yield curve can provide an insight into the outlook for the 
economy. An increase in the spread normally indicates an increase in the likelihood of 
the economy changing into an upswing whilst a decline in the spread increases the 
likelihood of a downswing. Figure I also shows that the yield curve has become inverted 
prior to all downswing phases of the business cycle and recessions observed in South 
Africa, although the timing between the inversion of the curve and the recession dates has 
varied from two to four quarters. This confirms the argument that the slope of the yield 
curve is a valuable leading economic indicator and as such correctly predicts future 
economic conditions. 
Figure I points to an interesting observation in the period between February 2002 and 
December 2003. Although the economy was still in the upswing phase of the business 
cycle, the yield spread started narrowing in February 2002 with the yield curve finally 
inverting in July 2002. This is in sharp contrast to previous observations when a decline 
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III the yield spread and an inverted yield curve was consequently followed by a 
downswing and finally a recession. The spread remained negative until September 2003 
when the yield curve changed to assume a normal shape. A question that one might ask is 
whether the shape of the yield curve gave a false signal in this period. This observation 
will be discussed later on. It is interesting to note that in this period, the yield on the long-
term bond rate was declining whilst the yield on the 91-day Treasury bill was rising. A 
closer inspection of developments in the bond and money markets during this period can 
provide an insight into this. 
Since the predictive power of the yield curve is compared to that of other variables seen 
as good leading indicators, the relationship between the business cycle and each of the 
variables is presented next. 
3.4 BUSINESS CYCLE AND OTHER ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
3.4.1 The Business Cycle and Stock prices 
According to the International Monetary Fund (2000:94), "there is extensive evidence 
that asset price changes tend to lead output growth in industrial countries". Such asset 
price fluctuations (including fluctuations in share prices) are highly correlated with 
business cycles and as such have a significant predictive power for output growth in 
many countries. Two major reasons have been put forward as to why share prices are a 
close indicator of business cycle conditions. First, stock prices incorporate information 
about future growth since they represent discounted values of future dividend cash flows, 
which in tum are determined by future economic conditions (Mishkin, 2004: 164). The 
other explanation comes from the wealth effects of increases in share prices (IMF, 
2000:96). From this point of view, an increase in share prices raises the wealth of 
economic agents and this enhances business and consumer confidence, which in tum 
leads to higher consumption. Figure 2 below shows changes in the JSE All Share Index 
during the various phases of the business cycle in South Africa. 
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Figure 2 
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The above chart clearly shows that changes in share prices generally move in a regular 
trend along the various phases of the business cycle in South Africa. Increases in share 
prices as represented by changes in the JSE All Share Index, normally peak during the 
upswing, and more often in the early phase of the upswing. After the middle phase of the 
upswing, share price increases decline but remain positive. Share prices begin to fall in 
the late stages of the upswing or early phases of the downswing. Figure 1 also shows that 
the decline in share prices tends to be lower in duration than increases during upswings. 
Share prices start to increase in the later stages of the downswing phase to complete their 
cycle. One notable feature of Figure 2 is that changes in share prices look more volatile 
when compared to movements in the yield spread as shown in Figure 1. 
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3.4.2 The Business Cycle and changes in Money Supply 
Monetarists believe a definite relationship exists between fluctuations in real economic 
activity, as depicted by the business cycle, and financial aggregates relevant for monetary 
policy (Stals, 1997:1). Monetary policy is therefore seen as the heart of the business 
cycle. Monetary authorities endeavour to influence economic conditions through 
influencing credit extension and money supply. An increase in money supply normally 
stimulates economic growth and is associated with the upswing phase of the business 
cycle, whilst a decline in money supply suppresses growth and leads to downswing 
phases of the cycle. Since increases in money supply may be due to expectations about 
both economic activity and inflation, changes in real money supply (which eliminates the 
inflation effect) provide a truer reflection of economic conditions. Figure 3 below shows 
the observed relationship between real money supply growth and the business cycle in 
South Africa. 
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Real M3 growth (yoy %) 
20 , ~adJ .'ea, cletote downsLJ Ph[.Jf the bu neu cyclG 
15 
5 
~ ~ ~ f\ "\ ~~ ~~ M ~ iP I 
r l 
-+ 1- -.+- r~ 
. ,;t\ 
+-'- -+--~--+-
1 \v , ~j 
1 
-- ----- --
10 
o 
·5 
-10 
SOURCE, QUOIN INSTITUTE 
61 
Figure 3 conforms to theoretical expectations since business cycle phases in South Africa 
are correlated to changes in real money supply growth. According to the above chart, real 
M3 growth increases and normally peaks near the end of the upswing phase to nearly 
coincide with the start of the downswing. In the early stages of the downswing, real M3 
growth declines and remains positive until the middle phase of the downward phase. Real 
money supply declines in the middle to late stages of the downswing and starts increasing 
near the beginning of the upswing phase. A key observation from Figure 3 above is that 
changes in real money supply growth have a shorter leading period to business cycle 
changes. This might show that changes in money supply have a shorter forecasting period 
for business cycle changes lJ 
3.4.3 The Business Cycle and the Index of Leading Economic Indicators 
The index of leading economic indicators is a widely used measure of the future state of 
the economy. The index is a compilation of economic and financial variables such as 
unemployment, new business formation, factory orders and interest rates that tend to 
move ahead of and in the same direction as general economic activity (Bloomberg 
Definition). Leading business cycle indicators are constructed from variables that have 
historically been correlated with future activity and a change in the direction of the 
indicator usually provides an indication that a turning point in the business cycle is 
imminent (Venter and Pretorius, 2001:63). 
Leading business cycle indicators are seen as strong predictors of economic activity in 
the short run and have been used in other studies to predict economic activity (Bernard 
and Gerlach, 1996: 15). This index, together with coincident and lagging business cycle 
indices, is one of the main measures used by the SARB to determine turning points in the 
business cycle. According to the SARB, changes in the direction of the composite leading 
business cycle indicator have led to changes in the course of the business cycle. Although 
the central bank does not use the leading business cycle indicator on its own, it does play 
an important role in the determination of business cycle (urning points in South Africa. It 
13 The optimal forecasting horizon for each of the indicators will be assessed later using the probit model. 
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is therefore interesting to find out if such an indicator can do better than other variables 
like the yield spread if considered on its own. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLODY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It will be recalled that the main objective of the study is to assess the ability of the yield 
curve to predict turning points of the business cycle in South Africa. If changes in the 
shape of the yield curve correctly predict changes in economic activity, such information 
can be used to determine the likelihood of recessions. Why should recessions be of major 
interest? Government policy always aims to deliver long-term sustainable economic 
growth and will always endeavor to prevent periods of recession. From a monetary policy 
perspective, an advance warning about an imminent recession allows policy makers to 
ease monetary conditions to mitigate the severity and duration of the recession. 
According to Filardo (l999:41) "an advance warning is particularly important because 
monetary policy affects the economy with long and variable lags". This chapter therefore 
presents the methods used in the study to assess the predictive power of the yield spread 
and the other variables with regard to business cycle turning points. The probit model is 
presented, reviewed and its use in the study justified. Before considering the popular 
methods used to determine business cycle turning points and the likelihood of recessions, 
it is necessary to define what a business cycle turning point is. 
4.2 BUSINESS CYCLE AND FORECASTING METHODS 
Over the past decade, several economists have devoted some effort into modelling the 
features of the expansion and recession phases of the business cycle. Such studies have 
shown that financial market indicators like interest rates and stock prices can be reliable 
recession predictors. Using the conventional definition of a recession, i.e. two 
consecutive quarters of a decline in GDP, the first of the two quarters represents a turning 
point in the business cycle and the beginning of a recession (Del Negro, 200 I :2). The end 
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of a recession is thus represented by the first of two consecutive quarters of positive GDP 
growth. 
For the purposes of this study, it is also necessary to draw an analogy between 
downswing phases of the business cycle and recessions. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) in the United States, the organization responsible for 
officially dating the beginnings and ends of US recessions, defines a recession as "a 
broad decline in aggregate economic activity (which is measured as a common movement 
in output, income, employment and trade), usually lasting from six months to a year, and 
marked by widespread contractions in many sectors of the economy" (Filardo, 1999:36). 
This definition of recessions is consistent with the observed downswing phases of the 
business cycle in South Africa as identified by the 8ARB (see Figure I). The NBER 
therefore considers the two-quarter definition of a recession too narrow, but for practical 
purposes, turning points of the business cycle defined using the NBER definition and the 
two-quarter rule are not very differentJ4 
On a broader sense, popular approaches to predicting business cycle turning points and 
the likelihood of recessions include using simple rules of thumb involving leading 
economic indicators or the use of econometric methods. Leading economic indicators 
(which are normally represented by an index) are commonly used and constitute variables 
that have historically tended to lead the business cycle, with changes in the direction of 
the indicators signalling a change in the business cycle (Pretorius et ai., 1999:38). 
Leading indicators are quite popular because they can be easily understood and 
interpreted. Forecasters also tend to rely on such indicators because of their in-sample 
forecasting power, i.e. they have been able to predict past recessions (Del Negro, 2001:4). 
Leading economic indicator indices have been found to be fairly accurate in predicting 
recessions but they generally have short lead times (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:55). 
14 In any case, once the economy enters into a downswing phase, chances of negative real GDP growth 
increase. In the period studied, out of the four downswings obsetved, using the two-quarter rule, the 
economy went into recession 3 times (in South Africa). 
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Regarding the use of econometric methods, two direct approaches to predicting twning 
points of the business cycle can be identified. The first and commonly used approach is to 
build a model that forecasts future values of GDP. According to Filardo (1999:39) "the 
GDP forecasting model is a simple multi-equation regression model, whereby real GDP 
depends on variables like past growth rates of real GDP, past growth rates of the index of 
leading economic indicators, past changes in the yield spread between lO-year yields and 
3-month treasury bill yields and past changes in the 3-month treasury bill yield". The 
explanatory variables may be lagged, relative to the dependent variable, by an amount of 
time equivalent to the forecasting horizon (Chin et ai., 2000:3). Such a model would 
therefore produce GDP forecasts and a signal of a forthcoming recession would be 
represented by a forecast of two consecutive quarterly declines in GDP. 
Various GDP forecasting models exist and they differ substantially from one another with 
regards to econometric methodology, variables used and the importance of judgmental 
factors. One key feature of such models is that they embody a so-called "extrinsic view" 
of the business cycle such that the underlying structure of the economy is stable and can 
be described and approximated by a linear probability model 15 (Del Negro, 1999:6). 
Business cycle theory shows that downswings and upswings in economic activity are not 
simply the result of huge external shocks but are also highly influenced by factors 
intrinsic to the economic system. GDP forecasting models are known to have a bad 
record when it comes to predicting recessions (see Filardo, 1999; Del Negro, 200 I; 
Estrella and Mishkin, 1998). Such econometric models also suffer from the problem of 
overfitting l6 (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:46) and their reliance on two consecutive 
quarters of negative GDP growth as a measure of recessions does not conform to NBER 
defined recessions. 
Given the large forecasting errors of large-scale GDP forecasting models around the 
turning points of the business cycle, Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) came up with a 
I S Extrinsic in the sense that the business cycle is only caused by external shocks to the system and not 
factors originating from within the system. 
16 Adding variables or another lag of a variable to a model can improve the in-sample results but undermine 
the predictive power of the model beyond the sample. 
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different approach to forecasting turning points in the business cycle. They estimate a 
non-linear probit model that directly estimates the probability of a recession at a given 
time horizon. Bernard and Gerlach (1996), Dueker (1997), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), 
Alta-Mensah and Tkacz (1998), Karunaratne (1999), Moneta (2003) and Moolman 
(2004) are amongst others who use the probit model in subsequent studies to model the 
likelihood of recessions. The major objective of this model is to forecast turning points in 
the business cycle and not future values of GDP growth. The model employs leading 
economic indicators to produce probabilistic statements about the prospects of future 
recessions or expansions for the economy at a specific time horizon. The probit model 
therefore uses a regression-based framework to generate a probability of future recessions 
given a set of leading indicators. A probability closer to zero implies lower chances of a 
recession, whilst the closer it is to unity the more likely it is that a recession will be 
experienced. In other words, the threshold criterion for the model is 0.50. If the 
probability obtained is less than 50%, the model signals an expansion since that is more 
likely than a recession. A probability above 50% implies a recession is more likely 
(Filardo, 1999:4). 
The major strength of the probit model is that it is geared specifically towards predicting 
turning points in the business cycle. This feature still points to a need for a large 
macroeconomic or GDP forecasting model that will be supplemented by the smaller 
probit model around turning points of the business cycle. Obtaining similar results from 
the two modelling approaches, together with judgmental forecasts, can enhance 
confidence on the forecasts obtained. Other advantages of the probit model are that it can 
be used to evaluate the forecasting power of any group of indicators one at a time or 
jointly; and the model allows the forecaster to identify the outperforming set of indicators 
at a given forecasting horizon (Filardo, 1999:38). 
Since this study specifically aims to predict turning points in the business cycle, and for a 
comparison to be made with previous studies, a probit model is used. The approach of 
Bernard and Gerlach (1997), Estrella and Mishkin (1998), Alta-Mensah and Tkacz 
(1998) and Moneta (2003) is followed. In the following section, the basic model used to 
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perform the predictive tests is described, together with the criteria used to evaluate the 
results. 
4.3 MODEL AND ESTIMATION METHODS 
4.3.1 The Pro bit Model 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991 :562) suggest that the yield curve may be a predictor of a 
binary variable Rr that indicates the presence (Rr = I) or absence (Rr = 0) of a recession. A 
model that relates the indicator variable Rr to the slope of the yield curve k quarters 
earlier can help study the ability of the term structure to predict the business cycle turning 
points. A standard linear regression model would be stated as follows; 
R, = a + PX,-k + G, (1) 
where Rr is an unobservable variable that determines the occurrence of a recession at time 
t and X,-k is the explanatory variable(s) - (lagged) - at time t-k. The integer k measures the 
time lag and this is necessary if the yield spread is to become a predictor of recessions 
that will occur several quarters ahead. Since the dependent variable (RJ can take on two 
possible values, i.e. whether the economy is in or is not in a recession, a binary dependent 
variable model is necessary. The major objective of such a model is to find the 
probability of an event occurring (in this case we are interested in the probability of the 
economy going into recession). There are three approaches to developing a model for a 
dichotomous response variable; the linear probability model (LPM), the logit model and 
the probit model (Gujarati, 2003:582). 
The LPM is the simplest of the three models as it can be estimated by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) but it suffers from various shortcomings. The most important problems 
with the LPM are that it assumes the probability of an event occurring increases linearly 
with the regressor, and the model also does not guarantee that the conditional probability 
of an event occurring will lie between zero and one (Gujarati, 2004:586). This is a major 
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violation of probability theory. The logit and probit models guarantee that the probability 
will lie between zero and one. According to Gujarati (p. 614), both models give 
qualitatively similar results, with the main difference being that the logistic distribution 
has slightly flatter tails such that the probability approaches zero or one at a slower rate in 
logit than pro bit models. Moneta (2003) estimates a logit model and his results confirm 
those obtained from running a probit model. The probit model is chosen in this study for 
easy comparison of the results with previous studies as most use the probit model. 
The model is therefore used in the study to relate the probability of a recession in South 
Africa as dated by the SARB during the current period to the slope of the yield curve 
observed several months earlier. The predicted values of the regression thus need to be 
constrained and to fall within the 0-1 interval. Choosing a non-linear functional 
relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables does this. The probability 
of a recession at time t, with a forecast horizon of k periods is given by the following 
probit model that is estimated: 
Pr(R, = 1) = F(o. + PX,_,), (2) 
where Pr denotes the probability that a recession will occur, conditional upon the 
observed value of the explanatory variable X lagged k quarters. F is the cumulative 
normal distribution. The parameters a and P are estimated by maximizing the log-
likelihood function (Atta-Mensah and Tkacz, 1998:5,). 
Several issues arise with regard to estimating the model (2) stated above. Firstly, the 
definition of a recession is fundamental for constructing the binary time series R, 
(Moneta, 2003:47). The recession indicator in the study is obtained from the SARB's 
official recession dates. The central bank applies the NBER methodology in dating 
official downswings of the business cycle and this method goes beyond the general two 
consecutive quarters of declining GOP. Applying this convention, the SARB identified 
four recessions since 1980 in the following periods; September 1981 to March 1983, July 
1984 to March 1986, March 1989 to May 1993 and December 1996 to August 1999. 
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A second potential problem arises from the nature of time series data. Dueker (1997:45) 
notes that the general probit model assumes the random shocks in the model are 
independent and identically distributed with a mean of zero, whilst for many time series 
applications this is not a plausible assumption. According to Estrella and Mishkin 
(1998:47), the probit model has an overlapping data problem such that the forecast errors 
are likely to be serially correlated. This raises the possibility that tests of significance of 
the variables using conventional test statistics may provide meaningless results. This 
problem is corrected by applying the Newey-West (1997) technique such that the test 
statistics are calculated using standard errors adjusted for the autocorrelation problem 
(see Estrella and Mishkin, 1998; Moneta, 2003). 
Dueker proposes another method to remove the serial correlation in the error term by 
adding a lag of R, (the indicator variable of the state of the economy) to the probit model 
(1) stated above 17 • Dueker observes that adding a lag of the dependent variable increases 
the validity of the assumption that the error term has a mean of zero, conditional on 
availability of information over time t+k. The new model proposed by Dueker is stated 
below. The model (3) is the pro bit analogue of adding a lagged dependent variable to a 
linear regression model. 
(3) 
A third key issue in the estimation of the probit model is a measure of the goodness of fit. 
The principal measure of the predictive power of a given variable at a given horizon for 
probit estimation was developed by Estrella (1995) and is subsequently used in several 
studies that include Dueker (1997), Bernard and Gerlach (1997), Estrella and Mishkin 
(1998) and Moneta (2003). The measure is a pseudo W, a measure of the goodness of fit 
of the estimated equation that corresponds intuitively to the coefficient of determination 
in a standard linear regression (Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:47). The pseudo R2 statistic is 
defined as 
17 Karunaratne (I 998), Atta-Men,ha and Tkacz (\998), and Moneta (2003) also recommend this approach. 
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Pseudo R2 = 1 - (L/L,) - (2/N)Lc (4) 
Where Lu is the value of the log-likelihood of the estimated model (unrestricted) and Le is 
the value of a constrained model containing only the constant term (all coefficients are 
zero except constant). N is the number of observations. According to Estrella and 
Mishkin (p.47), "the form of the above function ensures that the values 0 and I 
correspond to no fit and perfect fit respectively, and their intermediate values have 
roughly the same interpretations as their analogues in the linear case". The pseudo Rl is 
used together with t statistics from the estimated regressions to find the lags that give the 
best fit for all the variables studied. 
Lastly, it is necessary to measure the predictive accuracy of the models estimated. 
Moneta (2003:26) calculates the forecast error of the probit model as the difference 
between the estimated probability and the indicator of recession and uses the absolute 
value as a function of loss. Since in an ideal situation, the model should give I in a 
recession period and zero otherwise, a lower forecast error could be associated with a 
better accuracy of the forecast. Other studies (see Dotsey, 1998; Alessandro, 2000) use 
the root mean square error (RMSE) to compute the accuracy of out-of-sample forecasts. 
The RMSE determines how the forecasting power of a model evolves through different 
time horizons. This error statistic (according to Eviews User Guide) is a relative measure 
of forecasting performance and the smaller the error, the better the forecasting ability of 
the model. The RMSE is employed in the study, together with the variance proportion 
(VP), to evaluate the forecasting accuracy of the model. The variance proportion should 
tell us how far the variation of the forecast is from the variation of the actual series. 
4.3.2 Indicators Examined and Data Used 
aJ The Yield Spread: Since the yield curve normally inverts prior to recessions, an inverse 
relationship should be observable between the yield spread and the probability of a 
recession. A narrowing of the yield spread increases the probability of a recession whilst 
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an increase in the spread reduces the likelihood of a recession. Data on the yield spread 
used in the study is the difference in yields between the lO-year RSA government bond 
and the 91-day Treasury bill. Several studies (including Nel, 1996; Estrella and Mishkin, 
1998; Moneta, 2004 and Moolman, 2004) show that the difference between the two 
yields possesses useful information that can be used for predicting recessions. Another 
reason for choosing these segments of the yield curve are that they represent benchmarks 
for the money and bond markets respectively. This makes securities in these segments to 
be highly traded and thus represent a true reflection of financial market conditions. 
b) Other Indicators Used: Data on leading indicators is the percentage change in the 
composite index of leading economic indicators over twelve months. A priori, a negative 
relationship is expected between the change in the index and the probability of a 
recession. An increase in the index would mean higher expected economic activity ahead 
and thus a reduction in the likelihood of a recession (Venter and Pretorius, 2001 :63). A 
decline in the index would signal slower activity ahead and an increase in the probability 
of the economy going into recession. Data on share prices used in the study represents 
year-on-year percentage changes in the JSE All-share index. A priori, an inverse 
relationship is expected between changes in the All-share index and the likelihood of a 
recession. Data on monetary aggregates represents year on year growth rates in real M3. 
The relationship between changes in real money supply and the probability of a recession 
is expected to be negative. 
The series on the yield spread, money supply and the All-share index were obtained from 
the Quoin Institute, RSA. Data on the business cycle represents periods identified by the 
SARB as official upswings and downswings of the business cycle. These figures, 
together with data on the index of leading economic indicators, were obtained from the 
SARB. The period covered in the study is January 1980 to June 2004. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
Since the nature of the problem to be solved in the study is qualitative and the event of 
interest can take only two possible variables (economy is in a recession or not), a 
probability model is necessary. The probability model should give us the likelihood 
(probability) of the economy going into recession conditional upon the explanatory 
variable(s) chosen. As stated earlier on, the probit model is chosen, mainly because it 
features prominently in previous studies and gives consistent results. The general strategy 
of analysis is stated below. 
Firstly, the simple probit model (I) is estimated. The probit equation is estimated using 
each variable to assess if it has any predictive power. The objective is to evaluate the 
forecasting power of each variable individually, and to identify the optimal forecasting 
horizon for each variable. The simple probit model is also estimated including the yield 
spread in conjunction with the other variables to see if the variables used jointly perform 
better. The same analysis is repeated for the modified probit model (2) that has been 
corrected for serial correlation to see if the results improve. The pseudo R2 is the principal 
measure of the goodness of fit. To give a quantitative measure of the forecasts, the root 
mean square error and the variance proportion were used. 
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CHAPTERS 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section presents the results of the study based on the probit equations estimated, 
First, the simple pro bit model is estimated to examine the explanatory power of the yield 
spread with predictive horizons ranging from I to 24 months ahead, The optimal forecast 
horizon is determined by the highest pseudo R2 and statistically significant coefficients, 
The predicted or fitted values of the variables will be compared with the actual recession 
dates to assess if they have any prediction power. The results presented include a pseudo 
R2, the slope coefficient, the z-statistic and the p-value of the variable being tested, With 
regards to forecast evaluation, the root mean squared error (RMSE) and the variance 
proportion (VP) are presented, The comparative performance of each variable is assessed 
by the magnitude of the pseudo R2, the RMSE and the VP, The ability of the yield curve 
to predict recessions in South Africa is presented next. 
5.2 YIELD SPREAD: IN-SAMPLE RESULTS 
Table 2: Results from simple probit Model 
Pr (R/ = 1) = F (a + fiX /-,,) based on yield spread only 
Months 
Ahead k- I k~3 k- 5 k- 6 k-9 k- 12 k- 15 k- 18 k=21 k- 24 
Beta -0,2595 -0 ,3066 -0,3241 -0.3 201 -0.2659 -0,1958 -0, 1247 -0,0736 -0,0372 -0,0 148 
Z-
statistic -8 .5454 -9, 1237 -9.2642 -9.2598 -8,6444 -7.2694 -5.0755 -3,0935 -1.5787 -0,6265 
Prob 0,0000 0.0000 0,0000 0.0000 0,0000 0,0000 0.0000 0,0002 0,11 44 0.5310 
Pseudo 
R' 0.2980 0 ,3708 0,3979 0,3944 0,3 162 0.2048 0,0947 0,0348 0 ,009 1 0 ,0015 
RMSE 0.41 88 0.40076 0,3939 0.3939 0.4145 0.4432 0.4723 0.4884 0.4952 0.4965 
VP 0.3 130 0.2657 0,2496 0,2536 0.30 17 0,3948 0.5400 0.6900 0.8272 0,9269 
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The results presented in Table 2 show that the slope coefficients from the estimated 
probit model conform to the theoretical expectations as they exhibit an inverse 
relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the probability of a recession. An 
increase in the spread (steepening of the yield curve) leads to a reduction in the likelihood 
of a recession in the period ahead whilst an inversion of the yield curve increases the 
probability of a recession several months later. The results show that the term structure, 
as judged by the significance of the slope parameter, is useful for predicting recessions in 
RSA up to 18 monthslS. 
The explanatory power, as measured by the pseudo Rl varies with the forecast horizon. It 
increases from a forecast horizon of one month, peaks at 6 months and then falls 
gradually as the number of lags is increased (Table 2). The results show that the yield 
spread performs best at a forecasting period of around 6 months. The lag that represents 
the best fit is 5 months with the highest pseudo R2 of 0.3979 and a z-statistic of -9.2642. 
This result is significant at 1 % and if compared with the pseudo R2 of the other spreads, a 
conclusion can be drawn that the best recession predictor is the spread lagged 5 months 19. 
The root mean square error and the variance proportion are also at their lowest levels at 
five months. This confirms the findings of Moolman (2002) who observed that the yield 
spread successfully predicts business cycle turning points two quarters ahead. The probit 
results obtained from a forecasting period of two quarters can therefore be used to make 
estimates of the probability of a recession given the yield spread. 
Based on the statistical criteria of the highest pseudo R2 and statistically significant 
spread term, the best fitting probit equation for predicting a recession is the one for the 5-
months forecast horizon as given by the following probit equation: 
Pr(Rt+5 = 1) = F(-O.042243 - O.3242XJ (5) 
18 Slope coefficients are statistically significant at 1 % for forecast horizons of up to 18 months. 
19 The difference is very small between Pseudo R2 and z-statistics of 5 and 6 months. 
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The best fitting probit function (5) quantifies in percentage tenns the probability of the 
occurrence of a recession for different levels of the yield spread. Based on data from 
January 1980 to June 2004, and applying the best-fit probit function (5), Table 3 below 
shows the probability of a recession 5 months ahead based on the yield spread between 3-
month and lO-year government paper. 
Table 3: Probability of a recession as predicted by the best pro bit model 
Pr( .. ,}% 5 10 15 20 25 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Spread 5.22 4.14 3.34 2.62 2.23 1.64 0.93 0.13 ·0.64 ·1.50 ·2.46 ·3,82 
As the table indicates, the estimated probability of a recession five months ahead 
estimated from this model is 10% when the spread averages 4.14 percentage points over 
the month, 50% when the spread averages 0.13 percentage points and 90% when the 
spread averages -3.82 percentage points. The next question one would ask is: how well 
did this model predict past recessions or downswing phases of the business cycle in South 
Africa? Consider Figure 4 below. 
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Figure 4 shows the recession probabilities estimated from the historical data based on the 
best fitting simple probit model with a forecast horizon of 5 months. The chart shows the 
predictions of the state of the economy for a particular date, based on information on the 
yield spread that was available five months earlier. It is clearly evident that changes in the 
yield spread correctly predict changes in the business cycle phases in South Africa. A 
general observation is that the simple probit model correctly predicted all past recessions. 
Figure 4 shows that at the start of all downswing phases of the business cycle (except for 
the 1981-1983 slowdown), the forecast probability of a recession clearly exceeded 50%, 
thus confirming the reliability of the model. The probabilities decline during the 
downswing phases to signal an imminent change in the state of the economy as an 
upswing is reached. 
Although the predicted probability of a recession was around 30% at the onset of the 
1981 - 1983 recession, Figure 4 shows that the probability increased from less than 10% 
in 1980 to correctly signal an increase in the likelihood of a recession. The model, 
however, gives a false signal in 2003 as the probability of a recession increases to reach 
84% in April and May although the economy never goes into recession. Does this mean 
the yield spread is losing its explanatory power? We might have to wait until the next 
recession to get a precise answer. 
Next we examine the in-sample forecasting power of the other indicators to assess if they 
correctly signal business cycle turning points. The probit model is estimated for each 
variable individually and the results are compared with those obtained from the yield 
spread. A combination of all the variables with the yield spread is also explored. 
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5.3 COMPARISON WITH OTHER VARIABLES 
5.3.1 Real money supply (M3) growth 
Table 4: Results from simple probit model based on real M3 growth 
Months Ahead k~1 k~2 k~3 k- 4 k==S k=6 k- 18 k=21 k- 24 
Bda -0.0495 -0.0397 -0.0279 -0.0166 -O.ooll 0.0071 0.0936 0.0756 0.0546 
Z-statistic ·4.1499 -3.3606 -2.3732 -1.4094 -0.2811 0.5961 6.7101 5.6991 4.3114 
Prob 0.0000 0.0008 0.0176 0.1587 0.7786 
Pseudo Rl 0.0594 0 .0389 0.0193 0.0068 0.0012 
RMSE 0.4794 0.4847 0.4898 0.4931 0.4949 
VP 0.6105 0.67 15 0.7558 0.8469 0.9674 
_ Pseudo R" . Prob, RMSE and VP are not reported for highly insignificant results 
The results from the study indicate that the growth rate in real money supply does 
provide some information that can be used for predicting recessions in the very short run 
(I to 3 months). This variable however loses its explanatory power after 3 months as the 
results become statistically insignificant and the estimated coefficients change their signs 
and become positive at a 6 months horizon. This result supports the view that real money 
supply growth in the short term does predict economic activity but this variable is much 
more a coincident than a leading business cycle indicator20 Since forecasters are 
normally interested in longer horizons, changes in real M3 do not provide us with much 
information about future economic conditions and the likelihood of recessions. 
5.3.2 Changes in the JSE All-Share Index (ALSI) 
The results support the view that the movement in stock prices is a good predictor of the 
business cycle and can be used to estimate the likelihood of recessions in South Africa 
(see Figure 5 below). The movement in the All-share index loses its explanatory power 
after 12 months as the estimated coefficients lose their statistical significance. Based on 
20 The best forecasting horizon for real M3 growth is 1 month as indicated by the highest pseudo R' and 
lowest RMSE and VP. 
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the highest pseudo R2, low RMSE and VP criterion, the best forecasting horizon for the 
stock index is one quarter (see Table 5). 
Table 5: Results from simple probit model based on the All-share index 
Months 
Ahead k- I k=2 
Beta -0.0144 -0.01 50 
'L-
statistic -4.7371 -4 .9062 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo 
R' 0.0818 0.0884 
RMSE 0.4749 0.4735 
VP 0 .5602 0 .5472 
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5.3.3 Index of leading economic indicators (LEI) 
Table 6: Results from simple probit model based on the LEI 
Months Ahead k- 1 k=2 k-3 k=4 k- 6 k=9 k-12 k- 15 k- 18 
Beta -0. 1227 -0.133 1 -0.1391 -0.1402 -0.1292 -0.0964 -0.0620 -0.0353 -0.0130 
Z-statistic -8 .6051 -8 .7767 -8 .8613 -8 .8452 -8.6057 -7.7547 -5 .8800 -3 .6529 -1.4045 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0492 0.1602 
Pselldo If 0.3524 0.3848 0.4027 0.4051 0.3715 0.2635 0.1350 0 .0492 0.0072 
RMSE 0.4096 0.4017 0.3966 0.3961 0.4059 0.4324 0.4643 0.4850 0.4957 
vp 0.2724 0.2530 0.2445 0.2432 0 .2614 0.3386 0.4710 0.6401 0.8439 
According to the study, the index of leading economic indicators helps predict economic 
activity and business cycle turning points in South Africa at a forecast horizon of up to 17 
months. The estimated coefficients conform to a priori expectations, as an Inverse 
relationship exists between changes in the index and the probability of a recession. Its 
best predictive power is observable at four months (highest pseudo R2 than all other 
periods). 
Figure 6 
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The two charts above clearly show that the two variables (stock prices and index of 
leading economic indicators) correctly predict the business cycle in South Africa. Figure 
5 shows that changes in stock prices exhibit some form of volatility when compared to 
both the yield spread and the index of leading economic indicators. This could mean that 
changes in share prices perform better at a shorter forecasting horizon. Since all the 
variables studied above exhibit some forecasting power with regards to turning points of 
the business cycle when considered individually, it is necessary to compare their 
forecasting power at different time horizons. Consider the table below. 
Table 7: Measures offitfor probit model variables by themselves in-sample 
Pr(R, ~ 1) ~ F(a + {lX,.J 
k = quarters ahead 
Variables k~1 k~2 k~3 k=4 k~5 k~6 k~9 r-12 k~15 k~18 
Spread 0.2890 0.3143 0.3708 0.3886 0.3979 0.3944 0.3162 0.2048 0.0947 0.0348 
ALSI 0.0818 0.0884 0.0988 0.0955 0.0878 0.0860 0.0725 0.0214 
LEI 0.3524 0.3848 0.4027 0.4051 0.3923 0.3715 0.2635 0.1350 0.0492 
M3 0.0594 0.0389 0.0193 
Note: pseudo is reported for each model; 
_ indicates model is not statistically significant even at 10% 
Table 7 shows that the yield spread is the only variable that provides information about 
the likelihood of recessions on forecasting horizons of up to 18 months. At a shorter 
hori zon of up to 4 months, the index of leading economic indicators outperforms all other 
indicators including the spread, as it produces better forecasts21 • At the longer horizon 
(above 4 months), the yield spread provides better information on the likelihood of 
recessions than all the other variables, with the index of leading economic indicators 
being the second best. 
Although the All-Share Index does provide explanatory power up to 12 months, the index 
does not do better than both the yield spread and the index of leading indicators. Changes 
in real money supply do not do better than all the indicators at all horizons and thus 
2 1 Magnitude of pseudo R2 and statistically significant coefficients are used to compare goodness of fit for 
the variables at each horizon (see Estrella & Mishkin, 1998: Kurunaratne, 1999 and Moneta, 2003). 
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provide very little information on the likelihood of recessions. Based on the in-sample 
results, it can be argued that the slope of the yield curve dominates the other variables 
since the results are consistent and the spread only loses its significance after 18 months. 
The results are consistent with the findings of Estrella and Mishkin (1998) in the US who 
state that the yield curve outperforms other variables, especially at longer forecasting 
horizons. 
A combination of the yield spread with the other indicators is considered next to assess if 
the results improve. 
5.3.4 Variables Combined 
Table 8: Measures offitfor Multi-variate probit models in-sample (pseudo R2) 
K=months 2 3 6 9 12 15 18 
SP 0.3413 0.3708 0.3944 0.3162 0.2048 0.0947 0.0348 
SP+M3 0.4506 0.4499 0.3967 0.3345 0.3044 0.2624 0.1982 
SP+ALSI 0.3574 0.3879 0.4045 0.3245 0.2050 0.1024 0.0434 
SP+LEI 0.4734 0.5060 0.5018 0.3771 0.2229 0.0981 0.0353 
SP+ALSI+LEI 0.4782 0.5087 0.5055 0.3778 0.2307 0.1155 0.0440 
SP+ALSI+LEI+M3 0.5714 0.5650 0.5057 0.4096 0.3556 0.3086 0.2171 
Note: SP: y1eld spread, ALS I: All-share lndex, M3 : real M3 , LEI: Index of leading economic indicators 
A combination of the yield spread with the other variables in a single model confirms the 
results of the single variable analysis, although some interesting observations can be 
made. First, the yield spread remains significant in all combinations at least up to 15 
months. The pseudo R2 increases as more variables are added but some of the indicators 
lose their explanatory power. Real M3 growth is statistically significant at most up to 3 
months. The All-Share Index, when combined with the yield spread loses its power at 6 
months but is insignificant in all other combinations. 
The results of the model that combines the yield spread with the index of leading 
economic indicators suggests these variables form a strong combination across all 
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horizons up to 12 months22. Combining all variables in one model gives the best fit 
(highest pseudo R2) but changes in real M3 and stock prices do not have any explanatory 
power after 3 months. (See Appendix I for a summary of the results obtained from 
estimating the multi-variate models in Table 8). 
The next section considers results from the modified probit model. 
5.4 MODIFIED PROBIT MODEL 
As pointed out by Dueker (1997:45), one deficiency of the simple probit model is the 
assumption that the error terms are independent and identically distributed with a mean of 
zero. This assumption is not plausible for time-series applications since the error terms 
may be highly correlated. Following Dueker, a modified probit model is estimated to 
remove the serial correlation in u by adding a lag of R, to the simple model. The model is 
therefore allowed to use the information contained in the auto correlative structure of the 
dependent variable to form predictions23 . The resultant probit model is stated as follows: 
The pseudo R2 is calculated in the same manner as the simple probit model , although the 
restricted model Le comes from a model where only /h is equal to zero. This allows us to 
test for the information that goes beyond that already contained in the autoregressive 
structure of the binary time series (Moneta, 2003 :21). Table 9 below presents results 
obtained from estimating the modified probit model using the yield spread and a lagged 
dependent variable. 
22 The yield spread between 3-month and 10-year government paper forms part of the index of leading 
economic indicators. 
23 Sec also Karunaratne (1999) and Moneta (2003). 
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Table 9: Resultsfrom Modified Probit Model 
Pr(R, ~ I) ~ F(a + PIX,., + p,R ,., ) 
Variables k- l k-3 k- 5 k- 6 k-9 k-12 k-15 k- 18 k-21 k-24 
SPREAD 
Z·stat -3.1706 -5.3071 -6.1698 -6.3971 -6.2970 -5.6715 -4.6140 -3.7398 -3 .1670 -2.4602 
Prob 0.00 15 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0002 0.0015 0.0139 
Rio" 
Z-stat 10.2938 10.4805 8.8617 7.7542 4.5262 1.7090 -0.6239 -2.2046 -3.3343 -3 .3968 
Prob 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0874 0.0000 0.0275 0.0009 0.0007 
Pseudo 
R' 0.0475 0.1333 0.1664 0.1783 0.1575 0.1229 0.0785 0.0347 
RMSE 0.4710 0.4006 0.3969 0,4000 0.4248 0.4474 
VP 0.0154 0.0587 0.1503 0. 1992 0.3238 0.4275 
_ in pseudo R indicates negative values 
Several observations can be made from the results of the modified probit model presented 
in Table 9 above. Most importantly, the yield spread does not lose its statistical 
significance and its forecasting power increases to 24 months24 . Coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable are statistically significant up to 12 months. The lag that 
presents the best fit is 6 months (it was 5 months in the standard model) and the value of 
the pseudo R2 is 0.1783. The RMSE is also at its lowest at this horizon. This confirms 
that the yield spread provides its best forecast at a horizon of 2 quarters. The estimated 
probabilities of recession obtained from running this model are plotted together with the 
recession periods in Figure 7 and they are compared with the estimated probabilities 
obtained previously running the standard probit model. 
" Results from simple probit model with yield spread only showed coefficients were statistically significant 
in periods up to 18 months. 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 7 above shows the estimated probabilities of a recession using both the simple 
(dark line) and modified (light line) probit models at a 6 months forecasting horizon. 
Ideally, when using any model, the probability should be one in a recession period 
(shaded area) and zero otherwise. Figure 7 shows that the estimated probability increases 
in recession periods and remains low in upswing phases. Both models correctly predict 
peaks and troughs of the business cycle. The results from both models look highly similar 
and it can be concluded that the simple probit specification provides good forecasts, and 
the modified probit model that has been corrected for auto correlation confirms the 
results. 
Dueker (1997) and Moneta (2003) observe that the modified probit model improves the 
recession forecasts at shorter horizons. A different specification of the pseudo R2 is 
calculated whereby the restricted model Le gives the value of a constrained model 
containing only the constant term (all coefficients are zero except constant). This gives 
the joint explanatory power of the lagged dependent variable and the yield spread. Figure 
8 below compares the estimated probabilities at a 3 months horizon and confirms that the 
estimated probabilities improve when the modified profit model (light line) is used. 
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Figure 8 
Simple vs Modified Probit Forecasts· 3 Months 
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5.5 IS MONETARY POLICY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE YIELD SPREAD? 
The study has demonstrated thus far that the spread between short-term and long-term 
interest rates can be a useful indicator for predicting the business cycle and the 
probability of recessions in South Africa. Various factors are said to account for this 
empirical relationship, one of them being the monetary policy stance of the central bank 
(Estrella and Mishkin, 1998:50). The transmission mechanism of monetary policy 
suggests that a hike in short-term interest rates by the central bank directly affects the 
availability of funds to commercial banks, and hence their ability to expand the monetary 
base by giving out loans. This should be associated with lower future economic growth 
and a higher probability of a recession. A decline in official interest rates would have the 
opposite effect. A question one would ask therefore would be to what extent is monetary 
policy responsible for the yield spread's predictive power? The empirical analysis is 
concluded with an attempt to provide an insight into this question. 
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It is without doubt that monetary policy influences the shape of the yield curve. Estrella 
and Hardouvelis (1991 :566) argue that it is not monetary policy alone that explains the 
predictive power of the yield. They suggest that this argument can be simply addressed 
by adding a variable that represents the current stance of monetary policy to the probit 
model. The objective is to see if the yield spread continues to have statistically significant 
coefficients at the various forecasting horizons; i.e., does the yield curve lose its 
significance once a variable representing the stance of monetary policy is included. The 
SARB's repo rate (formerly bank rate) is used as a proxy for monetary policy in the 
study. A priori, a positive relationship is expected between the repo rate and the 
probability of a recession. An increase in interest rates should lower future economic 
growth and increase the probability of a recession whilst a reduction in the repo rate 
should lower the likelihood of a recession. The results are presented below. 
Table 10: Results from Combination of Repo Rate and Yield Spread 
Variables k-l k-3 k=6 k- 9 k- 12 k- lS k- 18 k-21 K-24 
SPREAD 
Z-stat 2.8478 1.9494 0.3170 ·0.6406 ·1.9507 ·2.7919 ·3 .2298 ·3.5403 ·3.0934 
Prob 0.0044 0.0513 0.7513 0.5218 0.0511 0.0052 0.0012 0.0004 0.0020 
Rcpo Rate 
Z-stat 8. 1228 7.9730 7.1723 5.4163 2.4904 ·0.1772 ·1.9602 ·3.1812 · 3.1752 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0128 0.8593 0.0500 0.0015 0.0015 
RMSE 0.333 I 0.3104 0.3149 0.3690 0.4314 0.4725 0.4857 0.4863 0.4873 
VP 0.1499 0.1303 0.1911 0.2841 0.4006 0.5386 0.6391 0.6404 0.6627 
The results from the probit model with the two variables (repo rate and yield spread) are 
quite revealing. Firstly, the repo rate is statistically significant (mostly at 1 %) for periods 
up to 12 months and the estimated coefficients have the correct signs. Secondly, the yield 
spread totally loses its explanatory power in the short run between 1 and 9 months, as the 
parameters are highly insignificant. The yield curve however regains its predictive power 
at longer horizons as the repo rate loses its statistical significance. It can be concluded 
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that monetary policy dominates the yield spread and provides the most explanation for 
business cycle phases in South Africa. 
Probit equations were also estimated to calculate the probability of a recession in South 
Africa using the repo rate alone and the results were quite striking. Based on this study, it 
can be concluded that changes in monetary policy have a major influence on the business 
cycle in South Africa2s Although the yield spread correctly predicts business cycle 
phases, most of its predictive power comes from monetary policy. Figure 10 below 
compares the estimated recession probabilities based on a model containing the spread 
alone (dark line) and the repo rate only (light line). What is noteworthy is the observation 
that a model containing the repo rate only does not give a false signal in 2003 as 
compared to the other variables, with the yield spread included. 
Figure 9 
Yield spread YS Repo rate: Problt Forecasts - 6 Months 
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25 It is not implied here that monetary policy is solely responsible for the business cycle. The results here 
are somewhat rudimentary and the effect of monetary policy on the business cycle could fill several 
dissertations! What is suggested here is that monetary policy appears to explain the yield curve's predictive 
power. 
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5.6 SUMMARY 
Empirical results presented in this chapter provide further evidence that the yield curve, 
as represented by the yield spread between 3-month and 10-year government paper can 
be used to estimate the likelihood of recessions in South Africa. The yield spread can 
produce recession forecasts up to 18 months, although it's best predictive power is seen 
at two quarters. Results from the standard probit model proposed by Estrella and 
Hardouvelis (199\) and the modified probit model with a lagged dependent variable are 
somewhat similar, although the latter model improves forecasts at a shorter horizon up to 
3 months. 
Compared with other indicators, real M3 growth is a noisy indicator and does not provide 
much information about the probability of future recessions. Movements in share prices 
can be used to predict economic activity up to 12 months but this indicator does not do 
better than the yield curve. The index of leading economic indicators outperforms the 
yield spread in the short run up to 4 months but the spread does better at longer horizons. 
The results, however, show that all the variables give a false signal in 2003 as they 
indicate a high probability of a recession that never takes place. A combination of the 
yield spread with the index of leading economic indicators produces strong forecasts. 
Based on the results from the study, it appears that changes in monetary policy explain 
the yield spread's predictive power. This is due to the fact that the yield spread loses its 
explanatory power when combined with a variable representing the monetary policy 
stance of the central bank. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The study set out to evaluate the ability of the yield curve to predict recessions in South 
Africa and to compare its predictive power with other commonly used variables that 
include the growth rate in money supply, changes in stock prices and the index of leading 
economic indicators. The study also made an attempt at explaining if monetary policy is 
responsible for explaining the yield spread's predictive power. Regarding methodology, 
the standard probit model proposed by Estrella and Mishkin (1996) that directly estimates 
the probability of a recession was used. Results from this model are compared with a 
modified probit model suggested by Dueker (1997) that includes a lagged dependent 
variable. 
The study confirms the usefulness of the yield curve as a predictor of the business cycle 
and the timing of recessions in South Africa. Results from the study support the findings 
of Moolman (2002), who concludes that the yield spread produces the best recession 
forecasts at a horizon of two quarters. In comparison to the other variables, the results 
show that the yield spread is the most powerful business cycle indicator at horizons 
beyond one quarter but it does not do better than the index of leading economic indicators 
in shorter periods. 
The yield curve correctly predicts all past recessions since 1980 but gives a false signal in 
2003, where it inverts but the economy never goes into recession. Results also indicate 
that the yield curve 's predictive power seems to reflect the monetary policy stance of the 
South African Reserve Bank. This is because the yield spread loses its explanatory power 
when combined with a variable that serves as a proxy for monetary policy. Before 
concluding with policy recommendations and possibilities for further research, an 
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explanation for the yields curve's false signal in 2003 is necessary. This IS briefly 
discussed next. 
6.2 WHY DID THE YIELD CURVE GIVE A FALSE SIGNAL IN 
2003? 
From theory, we know that the shape of the yield curve (and hence the spread between 
short-term and long-term bond yields) is influenced by various factors including the 
monetary policy stance of the central bank, inflation expectations, growth expectations 
and the demand and supply for loanable funds. The central bank, through its monetary 
policy actions, only has a direct influence on short-term interest rates such that market 
forces largel y determine the movement in the longer end of the yield curve. In an 
inflation-targeting monetary policy regime (like in RSA), a hike in short-term interest 
rates should tighten monetary conditions and lead to a decline in inflation expectations 
going ahead. Such an increase in short-term rates does not primarily lead to a parallel 
upward shift in the yield curve. Financial market participants (largely investors and bond 
traders) detennine the response of the longer end of the yield curve to changes in short-
term rates as influenced by the central bank. 
A hike in short-term interest rates that is perceived as anti-inflationary by the markets 
will reduce inflation expectations in the period ahead and cause long-term interest rates to 
decline. Why should long-term interest rates decline if there are low inflation 
expectations? The answer to this question can be obtained from the Fisher equation 
(nominal interest rate = real interest rate + expected inflation). In such an environment, 
the spread between short-term and long-term interest rates will decline and the yield 
curve will flatten, with a high possibility of the curve inverting. The upward pressure on 
the shorter end of the curve will be exerted by the restrictive monetary policy, whilst 
declining future inflation expectations will cause long-term bond yields to decline26 
26 Declining inflation expectations are also associated with a credible monetary policy action ofthe central 
bank, especially in an inflation-targeting framework. 
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One important thing to note, however, is that inflation expectations are not the only factor 
determining long-term bond yields. If the central bank raises short-term interest rates 
aggressively to fight inflation, this may sometimes be viewed as negative for growth such 
that the markets lower their forecasts for economic growth. This will be reflected in 
lower long-term interest rates, as the central bank will be expected to cut short-term 
interest rates in the future . A combination of low inflation and growth expectations will 
definitely cause the yield curve to invert. 
According to the SARB (2003:59), the yield curve inverted in 2003 because of an 
improved inflation outlook brought about by an appreciation in the value of the rand and 
a reduction in the supply of long-term fixed-interest securities by the government. Such 
inflation expectations led to speculation the SARB would start lowering interest rates, 
after hiking them by a total 400 basis points (4%) between January 2002 and June 2003. 
In a nutshell, it means that in 2003, the low long-term bond yields reflected low inflation 
expectations, an anticipated decline in short-term interest rates and a limited supply of 
long-term paper. Tight monetary conditions due to the hikes in interest rates by the 
SARB ensured that short-term interest rates were higher than long-term rates. 
Since the inversion of the yield curve in 2003 was a reflection of the above factors, with a 
limited possibility of an economic slowdown or probability of a recession, the yield curve 
gave a false signal and one would argue that its predictive power for economic activity is 
diminishing. This might be true but one episode of a false signal cannot provide 
conclusive evidence. The problem with studying or trying to predict recessions is that 
they are rare events and we might have to wait several years before we experience 
another one. It is therefore necessary to compare the predictive power of various 
indicators when generating forecasts in order to get more reliable results. One observable 
fact is that the yield curve is indeed a powerful tool as it reflects the rational expectations 
of investors. It is important to note that the yield curve possesses vital information not 
only about future economic growth but also for inflation and demand and supply for fixed 
income instruments. Changes in the shape of the yield curve will reflect a combination of 
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the above forces, with the most important one at any particular period largely responsible 
for the shape. 
6.3 POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
It is shown in the study that the yield curve (together with stock prices and the index of 
leading economic indicators) can playa useful role in macroeconomic prediction. The 
shape of the yield curve possesses vital infonnation on future real activity, inflation 
expectations and the demand and supply of funds in the bond market. The interaction 
between the above factors detennines changes in the shape of the yield curve from time 
to time. Although an inverted yield curve has preceded all recessions in the past, an 
inverted yield curve does not summarily imply a recession. A closer look at the other key 
economic indicators and the underlying conditions in the bond market is necessary. This, 
however, does not detract from the yield curve's usefulness as a forecasting tool. The 
South African Reserve Bank can read out future growth and inflation expectations from 
the shape of the yield curve. A flattening yield curve can signal the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in bringing down inflation expectations, as this was the case in 2003. 
Low long-tenn interest rates can also signal a great demand for long-tenn bonds that is 
not met by an adequate supply of pape(lJ Institutions like the government or corporates 
might find it cheaper at that particular time to raise long-tenn funds. 
The simplicity of the yield curve makes it a handy tool for supplementing forecasts 
obtained from more fonnal macroeconomic models and for crosschecking judgmental 
predictions. The probit approach used in the study provides a different dimension into 
forecasting economic activity. The probability of the economy going into recession is 
quite interesting on its own and can be used to compare with GDP growth forecasts 
27 Such demand can come from insurance companies and pension funds that seek to match their Iong-tenn 
liabilities. An inadequate supply may mean the government is unwilling to issue debt due to a healthy fiscal 
position that is reflected by low budget deficits. 
93 
obtained from a large forecasting model. Obtaining similar results, together with 
judgmental forecasts, increases the plausibility of the forecasts obtained. 
Since the study shows that monetary policy might be responsible for the yield spread's 
predictive power, a further investigation into this observation provides an interesting 
topic for further research. If monetary policy can indeed explain the business cycle in 
South Africa, can it be used more aggressively (although not at the expense of price 
stability) to boost economic growth and fight unemployment? Regarding methodology, 
other approaches at predicting business cycle turning points (such as logit and regime-
switching models) may be worth investigating. 
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APPENDIXl 
A) BUSINESS CYCLE PHASES 
Upswing Phase Downswing Phase 
January 1978 - August 1981 September 1981 - March 1983 
April 1983 - June 1984 July 1984 - March 1986 
April 1986 - February 1989 March 1989 - May 1993 
June 1993 - November 1996 December 1996 - August 1999 
September 1999 -
Source: SARB Quarterly Bulletm, December 2004 
B) PROBIT MODEL RESULTS FOR COMBINED VARIABLES 
i) Spread + M3 
Variables K=l K=2 K~3 K~6 K~9 K=12 K=i5 K=18 K=21 K=24 
SPREAD 
Z-stat -9.2274 -9.4483 -9.5368 -9.3528 -8 .4012 -6.8873 -4.5696 -2.3 122 -0.73 t6 0 .0637 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0208 0 .4644 0 .9492 
M3 
Z-slat -6 .3357 -5.6985 -4.6840 -{I.8nO 2.3773 5.2317 6.53 19 6.4339 5.5593 4.2780 
Prob 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0 .3832 0 .0 174 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 
Pseudo 
R' 0.4378 0.4506 0.4409 0.3967 0.3345 0.3044 0 .2624 0 .1982 0.1283 Om08 
RMSE 0.3836 0 .3793 0.3805 0.3916 0.4141 0.4248 0.4339 0.4502 0.4669 0.4799 
VP 0 .2220 0.2185 0.2265 0.2557 0.2798 0.2952 0 .3376 0.3941 0.4772 0.58 14 
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ii) Spread + All-Share Index (ALSI) 
Variables K~l K-2 K~3 K~6 K~9 K~12 K~15 K~18 K~21 K~24 
SPREAD 
Z-stat -7.7201 -8.1607 -8.3644 -8 .6247 -7 .9496 -6.9453 -5.2689 -3.4327 -2.3050 ·1 .5448 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.0212 0.1224 
ALSI 
Z-stat -2 .0 123 -2 .0696 -2.3428 -1.8068 -1.6040 0.2358 1.4735 1.5455 2.4384 2.8441 
Prob 0.0442 0.0385 0.0191 0.0708 0.\087 0.8\36 0.0000 0.1222 0.0148 0.0045 
Pseudo 
R' 0.3108 0.3547 0.3879 0.4045 0.3245 0.2050 0. \024 0.0434 0.0312 0.032 
RMSE 0.4153 0.4040 0.3960 0.3913 0.4133 0.4430 0.4689 0.4852 0.4885 0.4878 
VP 0.3076 0 .2802 0.2599 0.2509 0 .2967 0.3948 0.5336 0.6681 0.7126 0.7066 
iii) Spread + Index of leading economic indicators (LEI) 
Variables K=l K~2 K~3 K~6 K~9 K~12 K~15 K~18 K~21 K~24 
SPREAD 
Z-smt -4 .7107 -5.2406 -5.5860 -6. \046 -5.6861 -4.9386 -3.6679 -2.7739 -2 .2599 -1.8824 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0055 0.0238 0.0598 
LEI 
Z-stat -5 .8 185 -5.9725 -6.0389 -5.4475 -4 .2044 -2.3025 -0.9780 0.3912 1.7024 2.3439 
Prob 0.0000 0 .0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.02\3 0.3281 0.6957 0.0887 0.0191 
Pseudo 
R' 0.4228 0.4734 0.5060 0.5018 0.3771 0.2229 0.0981 0.0353 0.0197 0.0220 
RMSE 0.3857 0.3711 0.36 15 0.3635 0.3997 0.4386 0.4714 0.4882 0.4924 0.4914 
VP 0.2391 0.2170 0.2038 0.2075 0.2658 0.3802 0.5351 0.6879 0.7556 0.7411 
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ivY Spread + All-share Index (ALSI) + Index of Leading Indicators (LEI) 
Variables K~l 
SPREAD 
Z-stal 4 .7662 -5 .2958 -5.6198 -6.1482 -5 .7076 -5.0039 -3.7340 -2.8124 -2.2935 -1.8859 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0049 0.02 18 0.0593 
ALSI 
Z~sta t 
Prob 
LEI 
1.1 957 1.2700 
0.2318 0.2041 
0.9549 1.1 354 0.4741 1.5388 2.2243 
0.3396 0.2562 0.6354 0.1238 0.026 1 
1.5538 
0.1202 
1.8643 
0.0623 
1.9768 
0.048 1 
Z-stat -5.6530 -5 .804 1 -5.7645 -5 .336 1 -3 .9963 -2 .7442 -1.9271 -0.4 109 0.5960 1.101 2 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 1 0.006 1 0.0540 0.68 12 0.55 12 0.2708 
Pseudo 
R' 
RMSE 
VP 
0.4720 0.4782 0.5087 0.5055 0.3778 0.2307 0.11 55 0.0440 .0325 .0365 
0.3854 0.3709 0.36 17 0.3626 0.3992 0.4353 0.4644 0.4850 0.4884 0.4874 
0.2332 0.2104 0.199 1 0.2035 0.2653 0.3750 0.5 190 0.6674 0.7044 0.6826 
v) ALL VARIABLES 
Variables K~l 
SPREAD 
Z-stal -5.9435 -6 .1895 -6.2360 -6.1558 -5.3107 4 .1599 -2.4 198 -1.3194 -0 .9264 -0 .8634 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0 155 0.1870 0.3542 0.3879 
ALSI 
Z-stat 
Prob 
LEI 
1.5171 1.7595 1.3286 1.14 15 0.5693 1.8830 2.7749 2.1214 2.4412 2.4006 
0.1292 0.0785 0.1840 0.2537 0.569 1 0.0597 0.0055 0.0339 0.0146 0.0164 
Z-stat -5.2286 -5.4728 -5.4920 -5 .3147 -4.4308 -3 .8948 -3.4856 -1.9163 -0.7 109 0.1560 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 1 0.0005 0.0553 0.4772 0.8760 
M3 
Z-stat -5 .7888 -5 .2422 4 .2625 -0.2179 3.1471 5.8293 7.0289 6.6598 5.57 13 4.1500 
Prob 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.8275 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo 
R' 
RMSE 
VP 
0.5457 0.57 14 0.5650 0.5057 0.4096 0.3556 
0.3554 0.3486 0.3472 0.3622 0.3952 0.4 130 
0.1735 0.1610 0.1692 0.2040 0.2382 0.2560 
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